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OVERCOMING HIDDENNESS: THE ROLE
OF INTENTIONS IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Daniel Yeager*
Sweet Mephostophilis, so charm me here / That I may walk
invisible to all / And do whate'er I please unseen of any.'
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of some research I was doing five years
ago on the subject of pretexts, I tapped in the name "Whren" in
a Westlaw search and over 1000 citations appeared. This
struck me as a lot of play for a case that had been law for just
three years.' I remember then telling myself that if I wanted
to continue with the project, I had to assume two things: first,
that most of which was written on point would, if confronted,
reveal itself to be unhelpful; and second, that if in the future I
wanted to write about something about which so much had
been said, I would, well, have to remind myself of what I'd told
myself earlier. Make what you will of this version of Harold
Bloom's "anxiety of influence."3 Still, while I admit to not being
quite up to tapping in the word "privacy" into Westlaw, I don't
need to do that to get a sense of its centrality in legal dis-
course. All I need to do is look on my desk, which has an off-
. Professor, California Western School of Law. A.B., Kenyon, J.D., Florida;
LL.M., Illinois.
' CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, THE TRAGICAL HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND DEATH
OF DOCTOR FAUSTUS, act 3, scene 1, lines 11-13 (Sylvan Barnet ed., Penguin
Books USA, Inc. 1969) (1624).
2 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
3 HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (2d ed.
1997).
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print I just received from Legal Studies Forum, entitled: Law,
Instrumental Music, and Dance: Reflections of a Common Cul-
ture,4 which, despite drawing thoughtful comparisons between,
for example, Stravinsky's Le Sacre Du Printemps and
Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., also contains a five-page dis-
quisition on privacy, the relevance of which I am struggling to
make out. I guess perhaps I could make it out if I were willing
to work that hard, but more important for my purposes here is
that privacy is an enormous industry: claiming it (one could say
exploiting it), invading it, and not least of all, writing about it.
Indeed, privacy is a phenomenon about which most everyone is
inspired to jot down a position eventually. Only last week did I
notice that the Barnes & Noble near my house in San Diego
has on display a book published in 1997 called The Right to
Privacy, co-authored by President Kennedy's daughter
Caroline, who argues therein that "privacy is under siege."5
There you have it.
I should not, however, complain about over-participation in
the privacy industry. To do so would be to forget a remark that
I once heard Yale Kamisar make on an Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) panel years ago, where he said, only part-
ly in jest, that Miranda v. Arizona6 had helped him put three
of his kids through college. I don't know if any of us can or will
be able to say the same about Katz v. United States,' but I
think we could reach agreement that it has given us, and will
most likely continue to give us, more than a little to chew on. I
propose that at a minimum, we be grateful that E.L. Godkin,8
and more importantly, Warren and Brandeis,9 appropriated
Judge Cooley's innocuous description of a right to "personal
' Michael L. Richmond, Law, Instrumental Music, and Dance: Reflections of a
Common Culture, 27 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 783 (1999).
5 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY xiii (1995).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: IV.-To His Own Reputation, 8
SCRIBNER'S MAG. 58, 65-67 (1890).
' Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
[Vol. 74
OVERCOMING HIDDENNESS
immunity""0 from assault and battery and converted it some-
how into a highly generalized "right to be let alone." That we
are able to convene here to discuss it-that Professor Clancy
can throw a conference like this every year and put his guests
up in the comfort he does-indicates that the Fourth Amend-
ment is, contrary to a most popular myth, far from dead. In
fact, if it is dead, someone should tell Wayne LaFave: his
search-and-seizure treatise is in its third edition, is up to five
volumes, and has, I suspect, helped make him a wealthy man
by academic standards.
This Article rehearses a response to the problems posed to
and by the Supreme Court's attempts to work out the meaning
and operation of the word "search." After commencing Part II
by meditating on the notion of privacy, I take up its relation to
the antecedent suspicion or knowledge that Fourth-Amendment
law requires as a justification for all privacy invasions. From
there, I look specifically at that uneasy relation in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, which has come to privilege privacy over
property as a Fourth Amendment value. From there, Part III
reviews the sources or bases that can tell us what can count as
private: 1) the positive laws of property, tort, crime, and con-
tract; 2) laborious questioning of the sort performed by Chris
Slobogin; and 3) the routine versus nonroutine nature of the
governmental surveillance in question (let's call this the
O'Connor position from Florida v. Riley," recently resurrected
in Bond v. United States2 ). To the extent that the routine na-
ture of some intrusive actions does not disqualify them as un-
acceptably intrusive, Part IV suggests an alternative method
for determining what constitutes a search. In order to establish
that the intentions of both search victim and police should play
an important role in this determination, I take some care to
look at the unhappy role that intentions currently play in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence, particularly in the context of so-
10 THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTs 29 (2d ed. 1888) ("The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.").
" 490 U.S. 1014 (1989).
12 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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called "pretexts." After mapping my criticisms of the Court's
analysis of intentions in that context onto the question of what
constitutes a search, I am able to take a position on the extent
to which spying (as opposed to more coercive police actions)
should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment.
II. PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUNCTION
OF ANTECEDENT SUSPICION
When Wittgenstein wrote that "[tihe soul is imperson-
al[,],,3 he was commenting on a then rather new concern of
epistemology: the notion of privacy. Skepticism's concern with
the limits of knowledge was no longer just with identifying the
grounds on which we may make claims about the material
world. It had branched out inexorably into a concern with iden-
tifying the grounds on which we might make claims about how
things are with others. This opened up a whole new problem
for skeptics: it was no longer a matter of telling (knowing)
what's real from what is fake, dummy, toy, pretend, counter-
feit, illusion (or delusion); skepticism had trained itself on tell-
ing (knowing) how things are with others, a matter of peeking,
or at least feeling an urge or need to peek, into their inner
lives. Whether, for example, I can "know your pain" is a ques-
tion quite apart from whether I can know that you exist at all.
Even if we are twins or have somehow had identical experienc-
es, still I cannot actually know your pain: the limits of my
knowledge owe to the privacy of your own experience, here, the
privacy of your own body. This concern with attempts to pene-
trate privacy or overcome somehow our separateness makes
responding to one another unmediated by knowledge, since I
cannot after all really know how things are with you, not the
way I can know, say, a formula or a fact. But though I cannot
know your pain, I nonetheless can respond to you when you tell
me that you are in pain, though my response is in no way me-
diated by what I know about what you are experiencing. In
"3 STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITrGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MO-
RALITY, AND TRAGEDY 361 (1979).
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other words, the fact that you are to an extent hidden to me
may prevent my knowing what you are experiencing, but it
does not prevent my responding to you when you tell me what
you are experiencing (here, that you are in pain). I can on the
one hand acknowledge it, as in, "I've done all I can for you,"
"the serum is being flown in by plane," or, just, "I know." On
the other hand, I can refuse to acknowledge your pain, which
we could count as a repudiation of you, of your situation. These
responses or refusals to respond to you, because they are based
on a realm of knowing that has nothing at all to do with cer-
tainty, are manifestations of the problem of privacy. Indeed,
that our separateness or hiddenness from one another inevita-
bly creates problems between us-that you are in your body
and I am in mine-is constitutive or definitive of privacy.
I know I was not invited to the University of Mississippi to
give a disquisition on the body-what Emerson calls that giant
I carry around with me. But I do anticipate a payoff in compar-
ing the notion of privacy that precludes our relation to one
another from being based on knowledge with the notion of
privacy that ruminated in the Supreme Court from 1886 to
1967 and has been limping along ever since. In other words,
privacy is, by definition, a problem. Not so much the sort of
problem that Bill Stuntz wrote about almost a decade ago when
he complained that the right to remain hidden from police is
wrongfully privileged over the right to be free from being
pushed around by them." Rather, privacy is a problem be-
cause, while it creates a tremendous blockage between us, we
remain nonetheless responsible for taking positions, making
calls, and passing judgment on what others do or fail to do.
This must be what Judge Posner is troubled by in his Econom-
ics of Justice, where he writes that privacy in its secrecy (not
seclusion) mode is nothing more than a license to manipulate
and defraud others by keeping them in the dark about what
you really are. 5 In other words, it is my point that privacy is
" William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995).
" RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1981).
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a problem not because it is a less serious intrusion than is low-
level violence, but because it is read on a different plane alto-
gether than being pushed up against a wall, handcuffed, or
placed in the backseat of a police cruiser. Privacy is a problem
because you could be deceiving me, or misunderstanding me, or
I could take what you have done to be on purpose when it could
really just be an accident (or what I take to be just an accident
really could have been done on purpose). How should I respond
to you when what you say could be plagued with various modes
of insincerity or when what you do could be extenuated by an
excuse? In no case can I really know whether whatever is be-
tween us contains deception or misunderstanding; nor can I
necessarily know whether the harm you've done me was inad-
vertent as opposed to intentional. And if my response to what
really happened (is happening) is predicated on what I know,
then that is what I do: I treat the problem as one of knowledge,
and so I may do nothing when perhaps doing something is
called-for; but since I condition what I do on what I know, I feel
forced to do nothing while I fiddle around perfecting my knowl-
edge. 6 But doing nothing is also something for which I am
responsible and something which I must be prepared to elabo-
rate when demanded to do so by someone in a position to ques-
tion me. Certainly it is a response for me to say: "But I didn't
know, and since what I do hangs on what I know, I couldn't do
anything." But it is just a response. It may or may not in a
given situation get me off the hook for acting or taking a cer-
tain position when I should not have, or for refusing to take a
18 STANLEY CAVELL, The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear, in MusT
WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 329-30 (1969).
That couple over there, drinking coffee, talking, laughing. Do I believe
they are just passing the time of day, or testing out the field for a flir-
tation, or something else? In usual cases, not one thing or another; I
neither believe nor disbelieve. Suppose the man suddenly puts his hands
to the throat of the woman. Do I believe or disbelieve that he is going
to throttle her? The time for that question, as soon as it comes to the
point, is already passed. The question is: What, if anything, do I do?
What I believe hangs on what I do or do not do and on how I react to
what I do or do not do.
Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 74
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position or for not acting when I should have.
This is all in the hope of sketching out that privacy is a
physical limitation that creates more than physical distance
between us. It cannot be overcome by "inferences" or any other
means of denying what John Henry Wisdom-Wittgenstein's
greatest student (apologies to Elizabeth Anscombe)--called "the
otherness of others[.]" "v Privacy is a condition that defines re-
lationships, a condition of community that may explain, for ex-
ample, that feeling of loneliness we have all experienced when
we find others inaccessible or unknowable, or when we see our-
selves in the same way."8 You can be on guard against some of
the upshots of privacy's difficulties: for instance, don't believe
people whom you have reason to disbelieve. This is not to say,
of course, that one should always be on guard: "why believe
anyone (ever)?" is borderline nonsense." Indeed, only the
worst sort of skeptic-like Othello or like Henry Fonda in
Preston Sturges's The Lady Eve (1941) 2 -would be so full of
doubt (so obsessed with evidence) that they would believe in a
silly handkerchief or a photograph over the flesh and blood
" JOHN WISDOM, OTHER MINDS 217 (1952).
19 J.L. AUSTIN, Other Minds, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 112 (J.O. Urmson &
G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979).
All three varieties of worry may arise, and often do, in connexion with
the actions of persons whom we know very well. Any or all of them may
be at the bottom of the passage from Mrs. Woolf: all work together in
the feeling of loneliness which affects everybody at times.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 115.
The question, pushed further, becomes a challenge to the very possi-
bility of 'believing another man', in its ordinarily accepted sense, at all.
What 'justification' is there for supposing that there is another mind
communicating with you at all? How can you know what it would be
like for another mind to feel anything, and so how can you understand
it? It is then that we are tempted to say that we only mean by 'believ-
ing him' that we take certain vocal noises as signs of certain impending
behaviour, and that 'other minds' are no more really real than uncon-
scious desires.
Id.
20 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO; THE LADY EVE (Paramount Pictures
1941).
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woman who loves them. And look what happened to them. But
even for the person who doubts only when there are good
grounds for doubt, there will be no rescue from that nagging
sense both of a need for other people and at once a separate-
ness from them.
Hiddenness prevents knowledge, which in turn prevents or
destabilizes our moral judgments, at least to the extent that
they are based on knowledge or some version of it. If you want
to know what someone is up to, ordinarily the best thing to do
is to commune with them, ask them, or perhaps even behold
them. But when you have reason to believe that they are de-
ceiving you, or that they will deceive you, or when you are
afraid of tipping them off, then asking them what they are up
to, or buddying up to them or hanging around them are all
unattractive options. In these situations, their hiddenness must
be overcome through one of two ways: stealth or coercion. In
other words, if they will not let us into their private worlds,
then we must let ourselves in. But to do that-to invade their
privacy, legally speaking-you must already have a certain
amount of knowledge about what they are up to, that is, you
must be in a position already to make a moral judgment about
them. But of course if you are already in such a position, then
your need to overcome their hiddenness is weak, since you have
already overcome it.
Put in Fourth Amendment terms, you cannot violate
someone's privacy unless you have a pretty good idea about
what you will find if you do. This explains, for example, why
search warrants only infrequently turn up no evidence and
therefore only infrequently turn into acquittals for the targets
of the searches. Don Dripps put it this way in his discussion of
United States v. Leon2 nearly two decades ago:
[JIudicial hostility to the exclusionary rule, although doubt-
less present in certain cases, is not the only explanation for a
low rate of lost convictions. The second fact about search
warrants-their surprising accuracy in predicting the location
" 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
[Vol. 74560
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of criminal evidence-provides an objective indication that the
low suppression rate is consistent with the thesis that most
warrants are validly issued.
In the [National Center for State Courts] study, the au-
thors measured the frequency with which warrant searches
resulted in the seizure of evidence described in the warrant,
based on the number of returns filed. In six of seven cities,
the proportion of searches that discovered at least some of the
evidence named in the warrant ranged from 74% to 89%.
That record, reflecting the best available information, is strik-
ingly impressive.22
Dripps's point here has been proven by a much more recent
study conducted by my colleague Larry Benner, who analyzed a
random sample of search warrants issued in the San Diego
Judicial District in 1998.23 Focusing on the 122 search war-
rants for narcotics (49.2% of all cases), Benner found that, of
those warrants that were actually executed, some drug was
recovered in 73.9% of the cases' and in an even higher per-
centage of cases-a whopping 91.7/-where drug-sniffing dogs
were deployed.25 Let's accept, therefore, that police who search
by warrant have a pretty good idea about what they will find.
This "pretty good idea" is what the law calls "probable cause,"
which while not enough to convict anyone of anything, does put
police in a position to get by force, if necessary, the extra evi-
dence that can turn a justified invasion of privacy (based on
probable cause that crime has occurred) into a conviction
(based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that crime has oc-
curred). The rub, therefore, at least as I see it, is getting from a
mere hunch to the "reasonable suspicion" (which by Bill
Stuntz's extrapolation, requires about a one in four chance that
22 Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 924-25 (1986) (footnotes
omitted).
23 Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San
Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL.
W. L. REV. 221, 224 (2000).
24 Id. at 249.
25 Id. at 252.
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crime is afoot)26 or probable cause that would justify pene-
trating the privacy of the target of your suspicion. In other
words, when police have low or no suspicion that crime is afoot,
but they are nonetheless interested in probing further into the
matter, the Fourth Amendment constrains what they may do
with no justification at all in order to get the necessary suspi-
cion or knowledge that will justify their intruding further into
the matter and the privacy of their target.
This difficulty for police-that the lawfulness of their in-
trusions or surveillances are determined by or tied to how
much they know about you-makes good sense, too.
Hiddenness is not just a sort of problem in that you become
defined by, in a sense at least, being unknowable. It is for that
very reason also a sort of accomplishment. Some people, some
of whom are criminals, are better at remaining hidden than
others. I am reminded here of Chief Justice Warren's quip in
Lewis v. United States, where he wrote that the unsavory uses
of undercover practices and electronic bugging are largely di-
rected at the detection, apprehension, and conviction of morals
offenders involved in vice, liquor, or narcotics-activities where
"[tihe participants in the crime enjoy themselves" and so are
having too much fun to rat each other out.27 It is nearly im-
possible to exist in a community and block others from picking
up a lot about us; our simply being there in the public observ-
able world where what we say, do, and refrain from saying and
doing manifests more about us than we sometimes want to
reveal or think we are revealing. Someone who reveals nothing
or next to nothing at the level of action gives law enforcement
the perception that penetrating his or her privacy is necessary
not to confirm what they know about him or her already, but
instead, in order to know anything at all. People so good at
remaining hidden may be deceiving us as all so-called "private"
26 Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1023.
27 Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reason-
ableness", 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1706 n.206 (quoting Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 n.6 (1966) (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.10 commentary at 16
(Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
[Vol. 74
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people do. ("He is a private person" is a phrase that Richard
Posner insists has a pejorative sense).28 But leaving no trail
whatsoever is no mean feat. This may be what Scott Sundby
means when he says that the government must trust people
against whom it has insufficient amounts of suspicion: that
they have achieved a sort of hiddenness that deserves protec-
tion, not bashing.29 I take Sundby to be asking not, for exam-
ple, whether Greenwood had privacy in his opaque garbage bag
set by curbside for pickup, but rather, what Laguna Beach
police were doing rummaging through it. 3" Of course
hiddenness rarely inspires trust, though it is in the end a rath-
er neutral fact in that it is hard to know what to make of it.
Hiddenness is a problem: when we make judgments, we
cannot always rely on knowledge, so probable cause allows us
to take positions on who has done what and under what cir-
cumstances. It bears repeating that normally when people seem
hidden to us, if we are not in a position to commune with them,
we can apply pressure to them: ask them what they're up to.
Here, either we do not have enough suspicion (hiddenness
blocks us from getting it) or our revealing our interest in what
they're up to will cause them to withdraw or close up shop. And
what will intruding on others' privacy tell us? In other words,
normally our concern with privacy is with how things are with
other people (sincerity): the evidence of how things are with
them may be in conflict with the real state of affairs ("you seem
or look or appear to be nice"). If I cannot count on your forth-
rightness, that is, if I cannot count on you to reveal yourself in
a non-manipulative way, then gathering more evidence without
your co-operation, say, by talking to co-workers, an ex, or a
neighbor, is meant to overcome problems of sincerity (or, I
should say, insincerity) by gathering evidence that you do not
or will not voluntarily provide. That evidence, in turn, is sup-
posed to reveal something about your intentions (your actions
28 POSNER, supra note 15, at 272-73.
2 Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
'* Id. at 1790-93.
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in prospect) or completed actions that you would not own up to
if asked. As an aside, there are good bases for not coming clean
in the process or context of being accused, even when the ac-
cuser is a position to question us: as Susan Bandes recently
observed, confessing to crime rarely leads to reconciliation.
Instead, suspects who confess are uniformly charged with and
convicted of more serious offenses than those who retain bar-
gaining leverage by forcing police to demonstrate their guilt
through investigative strategies other than interrogation.3
III. THE DOMAIN OF THE PRIVATE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Was Katz All That New?
What special problems, then, does privacy (hiddenness)
pose to community's goal of providing protection for persons
and their property? Certainly the Supreme Court recognizes
that privacy is both a good and a problem. It has emphasized
for over a century the importance of privacy to a fully flourish-
ing life,32 yet at the same time it has resisted converting all
surveillance into what the Fourth Amendment calls a "search"
that would as such need to be justified by some quantum of
antecedent reasonable suspicion or probable cause.33 Not until
the 1960s, however, did the Court begin to worry to death the
conflict posed by an individual's right to remain hidden and a
governmental need to overcome hiddenness as a condition of
protecting persons and their property.'
As the Warren Court worked its way through the 60s, the
3' Susan Bandes & Jack Beermann, Lawyering Up, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 5, 12
(1998).
Studies show that suspects who confess are more likely to have charges
filed against them, less likely to have charges dropped, and less likely to
receive a plea bargain, that they receive worse deals if they do bargain,
are more likely to be convicted at trial, and more likely to be convicted
of serious charges.
Id.
32 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
' California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
, See discussion infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74
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doctrines of incorporation and nonretroactivity gave it repeated
opportunities to review criminal convictions. In those decisions,
as scientific investigative techniques emerged as constitutional-
ly superior to bullying (or what Don Dripps calls the arc lamp
and the rubber hose)," the Court overruled its then half-cen-
tury-old mere-evidence rule, which for no good reason had
threatened to keep the identity of criminals hidden. Warden v.
Hayden36 held that clothing worn by the suspect in the armed
robbery of a taxistand could not be described as fruit, instru-
mentality, or contraband, but the clothing was nonetheless just
the sort of evidence for which police (from then on) could search
for and seize." The kernel of Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion is his rejection of a so-called "primary right theory."3" This
primary right theory was oweable to Gouled v. United
States.3 9 Gouled had invalidated the seizure of unexecuted
form contracts, which had been described by the lower courts
as non-seizeable, since they were neither fruit nor instrumen-
tality or contraband.40 In other words, Gouled prohibited the
search for and seizure of purely evidentiary materials. Accord-
ing to Gouled's primary right theory, the government and the
search victim would compete over whose interest in the seized
property was superior.4 If the government had the superior
interest, then the government could admit the property at trial
" Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics:
Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 591, 632 (1990).
[Tihe warnings have contributed generally to a more humane police
culture, and they surely impose some limits on police tactics in specific
cases. The reading of rights affects the questioner, even if it glances off
the suspect. Only a corroded conscience could live with reading the
Miranda card by the glare of the arc lamp. And the law-abiding police
interrogator must tread rather lightly; too much pressure and the sus-
pect may invoke the right to counsel.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
3 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 300-01.
3 Id. at 303-04.
39 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
40 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 305.
41 Id. at 309.
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and retain it afterwards. If the search victim had the superior
interest, then he or she could repossess the property before
trial and thereby effect its exclusion.
In Justice Brennan's view, the primary-right theory had
lost much of its force as early as 1914, when the remedial
structure of the Fourth Amendment changed.42 Until then,
aggrieved persons obtained redress for illegal searches by tres-
pass and replevin actions, which were dependent on proof of a
superior property interest, but were unrelated to how govern-
ment obtained the property.43  That remedial structure,
Brennan continued, was discredited by the emergence of the
privacy model, which had changed both the meaning and conse-
quences of governmental illegality.44 Therefore, to declare a
search unreasonable after Hayden means that the evidence so
derived is inadmissible at the search victim's trial, even absent
the right to repossess it, as with contraband. Contrariwise, the
government now can introduce evidence at trial even absent a
superior interest, as with goods stolen from an unidentified
victim.4
5
This shift in remedy, Brennan wrote, ended the contest
over property interests. 48 For example, in 1920, in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States,47 a father and son who ran a
lumber yard had conspired to defraud the United States by
charging a government-controlled railroad for boards not re-
ceived.4' Brennan reads Justice Holmes's vague opinion in
Silverthorne to say that, as victims of an unjustified search of
their premises, the Silverthornes could replevy their documents
pre-trial. 49 Brennan adds that while the objectionable evidence
4 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304-05 (discussing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 393-396 (1914)).
Id. at 303-05.
" Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 307 n.1l.
46 Id. at 305.
17 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
"' Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs-in-Error at 4, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (No. 358).
41 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 305 (discussing Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391). The
decision reversed a trial judge's contempt charge issued against defendants for
[Vol. 74566
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included copies of documents that the Government possessed
legally, and not just the illegally seized documents themselves,
the Court nonetheless prohibited the United States from intro-
ducing the copies at trial, not on the ground that the copies
were the defendants' intellectual property, but because the gov-
ernment must not profit from its own wrong.5" Likewise, a
year later, Gouled successfully petitioned the Court to prohibit
the United States from using papers of evidentiary value only,
even though he had lost his pretrial motion for return of the
papers. 1 Since defendants in both cases achieved the chief-
thing desired52 without successfully asserting a superior prop-
erty right in the object seized, Justice Brennan concluded
(rightly or wrongly)53 that the suppression remedy had crowd-
ed property law out of the Fourth Amendment limelight.54
Seven months after Brennan authored his opinion in
Hayden, Katz v. United States55 would literalize what Brennan
had already established: that property law would no longer be
the theoretical underpinning of the Fourth Amendment.56 But
Brennan was right in Hayden: the foundation for Katz was
anything but new. It is by now a familiar story that from the
time Congress empowered the Supreme Court to review crimi-
their failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum for records, which were ille-
gally seized, then returned. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391. Holmes said nothing
directly about copies the Government had made of the records, except that illegal-
ly obtained evidence should not be used at all. Id. at 392. The illegal search and
seizure occurred when officers, carrying only a subpoena, stripped the company
office of all its books, papers, and documents and carried them away. Plaintiff's
Brief at 4, Silverthorne (No. 358). The subpoena was overbroad, and, like any
subpoena, carried with it no right of entry. Id. at 5, 9. Seven federal marshals
executed the subpoena while the Silverthornes were elsewhere being arrested and
admitted to bail. Id. at 4-5.
s Hayden, 387 U.S. at 305-06 (discussing Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392).
" Gouled, 255 U.S. at 312-13.
52 See Thomas E. Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case,
23 MICH. L. REV. 748, 758 (1924).
5 For a criticism of Justice Brennan's position taken in Hayden, see Daniel
Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the
Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 263-76 (1993).
5' Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307.
'5 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353-54.
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nal convictions and sentences, a "search" within the meaning of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence entailed some sort of physi-
cal invasion of an area that the search victim could claim as
his own. 7 What is less familiar is that even in the days of this
so-called "trespass doctrine"-which is generally viewed to have
begun with Boyd in 1886 and to have been extinguished by
Katz in 1967-privacy was its justification. No doubt Justice
Brennan had it on good authority when he noted in Hayden
that privacy had even then long been a Fourth-Amendment
value.18 For example, one reason that governmental investiga-
tors need a good factual basis to intrude into your constitution-
ally protected areas-your "persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects"-is that those areas or interests are or can be the situs of
matters or activities of intimacy; 9 or, in the view of Justice
Bradley, who authored Boyd, it is the Supreme Court's job to
guard against "all invasions on the part of the government...
of... the privacies of life."0 Similar language later appeared
in the majority opinions of the first Justice Harlan,6 and Jus-
'7 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'8 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307-09.
59 COOLEY, supra note 10, at 346.
An important civil right is intended to be secured by the provisions
incorporated in the National and State Constitutions, which, in sub-
stance, declare that unreasonable searches and seizures shall be unlaw-
ful, and that all persons shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against them. In their origin these provisions had in view
the mischiefs of such oppressive action by the government or its officers,
as the seizing of papers to obtain the evidence of intended crimes; but
their protection goes much beyond such cases: it justly assumes that a
man may have secrets of business, of friendship, or of more tender senti-
ments, to which his books, papers, or letters may bear testimony, but
with which the public have no concern; that he may even have secrets
of shame which are so exclusively his own concern that others have no
right to pry into or to discuss them.
Id. (footnote omitted).
'0 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
61 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
We do not overlook these constitutional limitations which, for the
protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investigations
conducted under the authority of Congress. Neither branch of the legisla-
tive department, still less any merely administrative body, established by
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tice Day,62 and throughout Prohibition, when privacy played a
part in decisions where the Court invalidated the search-by-
stealth of Gouled's office63 and two overreaching searches inci-
dent to arrest for Agnello's cocaine64 and Lefkowitz's liquor. 5
Congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making
inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen.
Id. at 478.
62 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
It is urged in a number of the cases that in a certain feature of the
statute there is a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion, protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
Amendment was adopted to protect against abuses in judicial procedure
under the guise of law, which invade the privacy of persons in their
homes, papers and effects, and applies to criminal prosecutions and suits
for penalties and forfeitures under the revenue laws.
Id. at 174; see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) ("Resistance
to these practices had established the principle which was enacted into the funda-
mental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle, and not
to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.").
63 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment is against all unreason-
able searches and seizures and if for a Government officer to obtain
entrance to a man's house or office by force or by an illegal threat or
show of force, amounting to coercion, and then to search for and seize
his private papers would be an unreasonable and therefore a prohibited
search and seizure, as it certainly would be, it is impossible to suc-
cessfully contend that a like search and seizure would be a reasonable
one if only admission were obtained by stealth instead of by force or
coercion. The security and privacy of the home or office and of the pa-
pers of the owner would be as much invaded and the search and seizure
would be as much against his will in the one case as in the other, and
it must therefore be regarded as equally in violation of his constitutional
rights.
Id. at 305-06.
6" Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
And later, to the end that government employees without a warrant
shall not invade the homes of the people and violate the privacies of life,
Congress made it a criminal offense, punishable by heavy penalties, for
any officer, agent or employee of the United States engaged in the en-
forcement of any law to search a private dwelling house without a war-
rant directing such search.
Id. at 32-33.
" United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
The disclosed circumstances clearly show that the prohibition agents as-
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In between Agnello and Lefkowitz, fuller explication of
privacy as a protected interest appeared in Justice Brandeis's
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.6" The dissent
cautioned that the sort of warrantless, nonconsensual tele-
phone tapping that revenue agents had done to Olmstead in-
vades the privacy of the target and everyone he or she calls,
violating "the right most valued by civilized men"-"the right to
be let alone."67 This reference to this cherished "right to be let
alone" was nicked from Judge Thomas Cooley's treatise on tort
law,8 which makes not a single reference to this right in his
treatment of the law of search and seizure.69 In the 1940s °
and 1950s,71 the Court spoke often of the Fourth Amendment's
sumed the right contemporaneously with the arrest to search out and
scrutinize everything in the room in order to ascertain whether the
books, papers or other things contained or constituted evidence of
respondents' guilt of crime, whether that specified in the warrant or
some other offense against the Act. Their conduct was unrestrained. The
lists printed in the margin show how numerous and varied were the
things found and taken.
The 4th Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable and
is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy.
Id. at 463-64.
66 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
67 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
66 See generally COOLEY, supra note 10.
69 Id. at 346-47.
70 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). In Goldman, officers eaves-
dropped on conversations through the use of a "detectaphone" that was attached
to, but did not penetrate, a common wall between federal agents and their sus-
pects. Id. at 131. Justice Murphy, in dissent, relied heavily on Brandeis while
describing "the right to privacy" as "1olne of the great boons secured to inhabit-
ants of this country by the Bill of Rights." Id. at 136 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
See also Brinegar v. Unites States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); United
States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 798 (1949); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947);
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 587 (1946); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 n.30
(1946); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944).
71 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Rea
v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1956); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
132-33 (1954); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 544 n.l (1954); On Lee v.
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protection of a right of privacy. Undoubtedly Justice Douglas
was the loudest voice,7" but not the only one. Bombshells like
Wolf v. Colorado73 and Rochin v. California74 explicitly antici-
pated the abundant privacy-oriented decisions of the 1960s. By
1961, when the Court in Mapp v. Ohio75 declared, "the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States,"7" the privacy rationale that would be pro-
nounced six years later in Katz could claim nearly a century of
support.
B. Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment
1. The Positive Law as a Source of Expectations of Privacy
Once freed from the hold of property law, to what would
the Court tie our reasonable expectations of privacy? A decade
after Katz, the Court recognized that constitutionally protected
expectations must lie somewhere outside of Supreme Court
holdings. That recognition appeared in Rakas v. Illinois,"
which denied Rakas a privacy expectation in a car in which he
was a passenger, evidently for his failure to claim a possessory
interest in the car or in the instruments of a robbery found
therein.7" In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119-20 (1951); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 7 (1950); Unit-
ed States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
72 E.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 205 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7' 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
7' 367 U.S. 643.
71 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
7' 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149.
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to concepts of real or personal property law or to under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society. One
of the main rights attaching to property is the right to ex-
clude others, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or con-
trols property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy by virtue of his right to exclude. Expectations
of privacy... need not be based on a common-law interest in
real or personal property,... [blut... the Court has not
altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining
the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by
[the Fourth Amendment].79
Rehnquist later clarified in Rawlings v. Kentucky"0 that
"in all likelihood" did not mean "in all circumstances.""1 There,
the Court rejected Rawlings's claim that his ownership of drugs
found in an unjustified search of an acquaintance's purse vio-
lated his privacy. Rakas, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, had made
"ownership... one fact to be considered[,] ... [but] emphati-
cally rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law
ought to control . . . the Fourth Amendment." 2
The authors of separate opinions in Rakas and Rawlings
thought that the majorities in both had given property law too
much 3  or too little 4  credit, even though nothing in
7' Id. at 143 n.12 (citation omitted).
448 U.S. 98 (1980).
SI Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-06.
82 Id. at 105. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1980), decided
the same day as Rawlings, the Court rejected defendants' claim that their having
been charged with a possessory offense conferred automatic standing on them to
challenge a search conducted under a defective warrant of Salvucci's co-
defendant's mother's apartment. "While property ownership is clearly a factor to
be considered in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated," wrote the Court, "property rights are neither the beginning
nor the end of this court's inquiry." Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91.
" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White chastised the
Rakas majority for tying the Fourth Amendment to property law, when the
Amendment's privacy basis traditionally had made ownership and possession un-
necessary as a condition to a search victim's right to suppress evidence. Id.
(White, J., dissenting). Cf. The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62,
178 (1979) ("In the name of developing the Katz 'privacy' test, the Rakas Court
has instead revived the centrality of property and possession by explicitly invest-
ing only the owner/possessor with a clear 'legitimate expectation.).
84 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 114-20
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Rehnquist's opinion in either decision tells us how much weight
the "consider[ation]" deserves."5 Justice Blackmun told us in
Rawlings that property rights should occupy a position some-
where above that given them by Rehnquist, but below that of
the pre-Katz era:
Nor do I read this Court's decisions to hold that property
interests cannot be, in some circumstances at least, weighty
factors in establishing the existence of Fourth Amendment
rights. Not every concept of ownership or possession is 'ar-
cane.' Not every interest in property exists only in the des-
iccated atmosphere of ancient maxims and dusty books .... In
my view, th[e] 'right to exclude' often may be a principal de-
terminant in the establishment of a legitimate Fourth
Amendment interest.8
Despite the "weighty" and "principal" status of property
law, Blackmun concluded that Rawlings's ownership of the
drugs he had deposited in an acquaintance's purse moments
before it was invaded by police was insufficient to ground a
privacy interest, but more convincing evidence of a bailment
contract between the parties (another expectation expressed in
the positive law) would have led him to conclude otherwise.87
(And that the facts of Rawlings did lead Professor
LaFave-whom the Court has cited 123 times-to recognize
Rawlings as bailee is a good sign that the Court had missed
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 13 (1983) ("[Rakas] did not elevate
property rights over privacy rights so much as it diminished the value of both.").
'a Cf. Ira Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois:
From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 197, 219 (1981) ("Katz
and Alderman . .. [held] that the property right is merely one of many factors to
consider in deciding [Flourth [A]mendment issues. Rakas carried this line of rea-
soning to its logical conclusion by holding that the Jones test . ..was not dispos-
itive, and was but one of many issues to consider."); id. at 223 ("IThe Rawlings
majority . .. list[ed] numerous factors other than possession of the purse which
could have given the defendant a legitimate expectation of privacy.").
" Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 112 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Mickenberg,
supra note 85 at 223 n.128 (suggesting that Blackmun "urges the adoption of
such a fixed rule").
" Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 112-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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something essential there).'M  Justice Marshall dissented,
agreeing with Blackmun's statement that not all property law
is "arcane." 9 But Marshall's endorsement, too, at least in this
case, was pitched at too high a level of abstraction to be in-
structive. "Rejection of those finely drawn distinctions as irrele-
vant to the concerns of the Fourth Amendment," he wrote, "did
not render property rights wholly outside its protection."91 No
doubt ownership or possession is for the Court an indicia of a
protected interest. The uncertainty is over how to weight the
interest. In the Court's own words, property law remains "mar-
ginally relevant," "weighty," "principal," and, according to a
1992 case, Soldal v. Cook County,92 not altogether "snuffed
out."
None of the decisions quoted above cut against the sense
that, at its inception, Katz93 was meant to supplement, not
supplant, property law. And to the extent that pre-Katz cases
such as Jones v. United States,94  Silverman v. United
States,9  Chapman v. United States," and Hayden" made
"8 Professor LaFave properly criticized the Court for its failure to see that a
bailment had in fact occurred, and for ignoring the legal consequences of such an
arrangement. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3(c), at 153-58 (3d ed. 1996).
89 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 In at least one other case, Marshall was explicit.
As the Court acknowledges, we have traditionally looked to a vari-
ety of factors in determining whether an expectation of privacy asserted
in a physical space is "reasonable." Though those factors do not lend
themselves to precise taxonomy, they may be roughly grouped into three
categories. First, we consider whether the expectation at issue is rooted
in entitlements defined by positive law. Second, we consider the nature
of the uses to which spaces of the sort in question can be put. Third, we
consider whether the person claiming a privacy interest manifested that
interest to the public in a way that most people would understand and
respect.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
"' Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
92 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992).
93 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9' 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
9 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
365 U.S. 610 (1961).
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any other reading of Katz possible, then those cases, or those
interpreting them, were wrong.9" At its very narrowest (in-
deed, superficially), Katz solved the specific problem posed by
modes of eavesdropping that the law of trespass could not ade-
quately regulate. Or, as Judge Posner puts it, electronic eaves-
dropping interferes with the secrecy of communications, but not
with the seclusional interests of the communicators.99 Katz's
solution was that proof of a governmental trespass into a con-
stitutionally protected area no longer would be a necessary
condition to Fourth Amendment protection against quests for
evidence. 100 Necessary, no; sufficient, yes.' It follows that
the positive laws not only of property, but of crime, tort, and
contract could easily govern a good number of cases that ad-
dress when a search occurs, whose interest it invades, and who
may privately authorize such a search. The Court purports to
recognize this when it declared in Rakas that our expectations
of privacy "must have a source outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment."0 2 That dictum notwithstanding, property law (specifi-
cally) and the positive law (more generally) remain relevant,
but dilute-mentioned for unstated reasons and with inconsis-
tency from case to case and justice to justice.0 3 Property law's
status, for example, slides awkwardly from "weighty" and
"principal" to no status at all.'0 4 A more formal and less errat-
ic acknowledgment of "expressed expectations of privacy before
resorting to unexpressed ones would not only make Fourth
Amendment litigation more predictable, but more protective as
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
98 See Yeager, supra note 53.
9, POSNER, supra note 15, at 320-21.
10 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
101 It is not that property rights are "only marginally" relevant to Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court recently explained; rather, as Hayden and Katz
recognized that "protection of privacy" is the "principle' object of the Amendment,"
property no longer is "the sole measure" of protection. But this is not to say,
added the Court, that "this shift in emphasis had snuffed out" the relevance of
property law to Fourth Amendment cases. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64
(1992).
o Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
103 See Yeager, supra note 53, at 306.
104 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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well-at least where the positive law identifies an interest that
a reviewing court could otherwise . . . ignore."" 5
The positive law is a source of data about expectations,
many of which relate to the right to exclude others. And while I
remain convinced that extant positive laws have a way of insin-
uating themselves into cases even where the Court expressly
denies their relevance, here I am not so much interested in
asking whether the garbage, liquor, and hotel room were aban-
doned in Greenwood, °6 Hester,°7 and Abel,' whether it
was contract law that explains the outcomes in Stoner"°9 and
Chapman,"' whether Cox had become the bailee of
Rawlings,"' whether the Kentucky and Texas laws of crimi-
nal trespass are relevant to whether Oliver"' and Dunn"'
were searched, whether Michigan trade-secret law should have
(or did) play a role in Dow,"' whether FAA minimum-over-
flight regulations are meant to contribute to privacy,15 or
whether anything helpful or even intelligible is added by re-
pudiating the privacy claims of nontrespassers like Carter"6
and Rakas,"' but not of Olson"' and Jones."9 Instead, I'm
being bitten by a bigger, or at least different flea: how should
the Fourth Amendment respond if the evidence-gathering strat-
egy is legally kosher, that is, if what the police do offends no
expression of the positive law?
10 Yeager, supra note 53, at 252.
1 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
' Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
10 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
100 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
11 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
. Rawlins v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
11 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
11. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
14 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
s California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445
(1989).
"' Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1999).
117 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S 128 (1978).
... Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
19 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
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2. Laborious Questioning of Others
I doubt that anyone would give me too hard a time for
stating that law is a source of expectations of privacy.20 But
what about the not-insubstantial number of cases where inves-
tigators whose acts of observation violate no property law,
conunit no crime or tort, and cause no breach of contract? Then
what? To embellish Supreme Court pronouncements on the
grammar of searches, Chris Slobogin published an empirical
study in Duke Law Journal over a decade ago. 2 ' There he
posited that if, according to Katz a search occurs when govern-
mental action invades the suspect's reasonable expectation of
privacy, then deciding whether a search occurs is an empirical
question whose answer should serve as "social authority" (read,
"law"). 2 In other words, if the Court is going to reflect rather
than dictate our expectations, then Slobogin would have us
identify systematically what we expect. With that insight in
mind, Slobogin asked a group-mostly students-to rate the
intrusiveness of various governmental quests for evidence.
While he concedes having picked his subjects in a way that
might have tilted the results-most are law students or other-
wise law sensitive"23-still his study provides a far more accu-
rate reflection of privacy expectations than the unidentified
sources on which the Court relies. Specific examples of inves-
tigative practices that offend the public far more than they do
the Court are the government's use of informers and the
government's perusal of bank records.'24 But apart from the
positive law and apart from laborious questioning of others
about what they find intrusive and how intrusive they find it,
120 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 189 (1984); see supra note 90.
121 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE IN-
VESTIGATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 219-25
(2d ed. 1998) (reproducing Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rea-
sonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An
Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42
DUKE L.J. 727 (1993)).
122 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 121, at 755.
13 Id. at 737.
124 SLOBOGIN, supra note 121, at 221.
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there must be some other way, some criteria, for getting at the
question of what sorts of actions constitute a search and need
as such to be justified by an adequate amount of antecedent
suspicion.
My point here is not to undermine the value of Slobogin's
survey. Indeed, I would rather bank on his empirical account of
how the public assesses various intrusions than wait for the
Court's pronouncements, which tend to or at least seem to
come from out of nowhere. I say this fully aware, of course,
that the Justices, too, are native speakers of English whose
utterances are evidence of what we mean by, and how we use,
the word "privacy." My intention here is to point to something
that the Slobogin study does not: a method by which we could
elaborate what would make an action count as intrusive enough
to require a justification.
3. Three Steps Back to Katz: Ciraolo to Riley to Bond
In the published version of a speech he delivered at the
University of Arizona in 1986, Wayne LaFave discussed at
some length one of two overflight cases that the Court decided
on the same day.'25 In California v. Ciraolo,'26
Santa Clara police received an anonymous tip that marijuana
was growing in respondent's backyard. An effort at ground-
level surveillance went for naught, as respondent had decided
to conceal his gardening and other curtilage-based deport-
ment from passersby with a solid 6-foot outer fence and 10-
foot inner fence. Undaunted, the officer assigned to this inves-
tigation then secured a private plane and flew over
respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. He and the
officer with him, both trained in marijuana identification,
readily identified in a 15 by 25 foot plot in respondent's back-
yard marijuana plants growing 8-10 feet high ....
Based upon an affidavit describing the anonymous tip
and those observations, a search warrant was issued and
125 See Wayne R. LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 291, 295-308 (1986).
1'6 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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executed, resulting in the seizure of 73 marijuana plants. 2 7
After Ciraolo's suppression motion was denied, he pleaded
guilty to unlawful gardening, but a state appellate court re-
versed the conviction on the ground that the aerial observation
was an illegal search of Ciraolo's "curtilage."12' The Supreme
Court, however, held that no search had occurred.129 To sub-
stantiate this conclusion, Chief Justice Burger stated that
"itihe Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police
traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a war-
rant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye."1 '
In fact, Burger continued, "a 10-foot fence might not shield
these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched
on the top of a ... 2-level bus."131 LaFave reports that the
Chief Justice had, just before the October 1985 Term, visited
London. 13 2 LaFave could not confirm that while there Burger
had actually ridden one of these buses, which Burger neverthe-
less imagined posed a threat that marijuana growers must
guard themselves against. But LaFave did note that "[tihe
Chief Justice's reference to double-decker buses suggests that
his travels to London have had a profound effect upon his out-
look, but it does not reflect knowledge of the state of affairs in
Santa Clara .... [where] there are no double-decker bus-
es . . . . 133 Elaborating the dissenters' claim that "the actual
risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually
nonexistent,"1 34 LaFave emphasized as well that the majority
"fails to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police
surveillance and other uses made of the air space. Members of
the public use the air space for travel, business, or pleasure,
not for the purpose of observing activities taking place within
127 LaFave, supra note 125, at 295-96
128 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210.
129 Id. at 214-15.
'30 Id. at 215.
... Id. at 211.
'3 LaFave, supra note 125, at 298 n.44.
Id. at 298 (footnote omitted).
I d. at 300 (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
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residential yards." i"5
This position that LaFave and the four dissenters in
Ciraolo took toward the deployment of airplanes as a way of
getting enough information to authorize a subsequent search
picked up some real momentum three years later in Florida v.
Riley, 136 which featured a helicopter hovering around at 400
feet, a low but lawful height."3 7 While Justice White's opinion
for the plurality relied largely on Ciraolo's risk analysis,13 s
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to express that a search
takes place whenever the government positions itself as an
observer in a way or from a vantage point that would be non-
routine for a private actor to occupy.'39 The Pasco County
Sheriffs' naked-eye observations made from a helicopter of
Riley's curtilage (a close-to-the-home greenhouse with a miss-
ing pane of glass in a rural area known best for the production
of Kumquats) were held to be a nonsearch. 40 Five justices,
however, refused to follow the teaching of Ciraolo, which ruled
that anytime the government is acting lawfully (at least with
the unaided eye) it is by definition then not searching, that is,
not invading a reasonable expectation of privacy.14 ' Those five
in Riley were: O'Connor 4 1 (who sided with the majority be-
cause Riley adduced no evidence that such occurrences were
unusual and she saw no need to remand the case for such find-
ings), Blackmun' (who dissented and would remand for such
findings), plus Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens (who dissented
and saw no need to remand).'"
Despite the pile of Katz cases decided by the Court in the
133 Id. at 301 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
'3 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
137 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
138 Id. at 450 (plurality opinion).
13 Id. at 454-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 452 (plurality opinion).
141 Certainly I am not the first to notice this. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, What
Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in the Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 119, 132 (2002).
14 Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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1980s, culminating in Riley, there have been precious few in
the fifteen years since. There have been two complete non-
events: Padilla4 ' (working out the stake that co-conspirators
may have in the property used in their illegal ventures) and
Kyllo146 (what I see as a much-ado-about-nothing re-affirming
of Karo v. United States)."' There has been one potentially
revelatory instance of Katz analysis: Minnesota v. Carter."5
In Carter, when Officer Thielen cozied up for fifteen minutes to
the window of Thompson's apartment-stepping around some
shrubs to install himself only a foot from a window almost-but-
not-quite-perfectly covered with horizontal blinds-he was
violating no Minnesota law I know of.19 This was no search
of casual business guests Carter and Johns, we were told,
though we got no answer on whether it was a search at all,
meaning, whether it was a search of Thompson, in whose
apartment the criminal drug-packaging venture was being
pursued. Only Justice Breyer ruled on the question, stating for
only himself in just one page that Thielen's Peeping Tomming
was no search: that type of intrusion is lawful and a risk you
run living in a garden apartment with a crack in your
blinds.' °
There has been one most interesting though compressed,
recent, post-Riley decision on point, however: Bond v. United
States.'5' Bond and Wiggs (a co-defendant at trial) were pas-
sengers on a Greyhound Bus traveling on 1-10 en route to Lit-
tle Rock, Arkansas when it was boarded by U.S. Border Patrol
' United States v. Padilla, 960 F.2d 854, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1992).
14 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
... See id. at 39 (citing Karo v. United States, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)). For the
view that Kyllo was a significant decision, see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping
Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393 (2002) and Raymond Shih Ray
Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies After
Kyllo, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002).
'48 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
14 Carter, 525 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 105-06 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualita-
tive Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness", 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642,
1681 nn.155-83 (1998).
11' 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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Agent Cesar Cantu Jr. at an immigration checkpoint near El
Paso, Texas.'52 After doing some "immigration checks," Agent
Cantu reports: "as I was working my way out, I felt a green
bag that I could feel a brick-like object in it."'53 Bond and
Wiggs were seated together beneath the green canvas bag,
which measured "about maybe a foot and a half long by a foot
tall, about a foot width."5 4 Because agents frequently find
narcotics packaged in brick shapes, this one aroused the suspi-
cions of Agent Cantu.15 When Cantu then asked who owned
the bag, Bond (who had been established as lawfully in the
country) claimed ownership and became nervous."6 Cantu
asked for permission to search the bag; Bond granted it.
157
The brick-shaped object was 1.34 pounds of methamphet-
amine 58 wrapped in a pair of pants."9 After Bond and the
bag were taken off the bus, Cantu returned and squeezed
Wiggs's backpack, which also had a similar brick-shaped object
in it. 60 When Cantu asked who owned it, Wiggs claimed own-
ership, 6' admitted that he and Bond were traveling togeth-
er,162 and apparently consented to a search of his back-
pack, 63 which revealed a 1.32-pound brick of methamphet-
amine. 64 The men were Mirandized, waived their rights, and
in response to a brief interrogation, confessed that a man in
California named Tony Alvarez was going to pay them for de-
livering the drugs to an un-named man at a Holiday Inn in
Little Rock. 6' The suspects were then handed over to the
152 Bond, 529 U.S. at 335.
152 Id. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Hearing on Motion to Suppress Evidence Held on September 18, 1997, at
10, United States v. Bond (No. EP-97-CR-682-H).
... Hearing at 10, Bond (No. EP-97-CR-682-H).
Id. at 11-12.
Is id. at 12.
' Id. at 18.
's' Id. at 12-13.
" Id. at 15-16.
"' Id. at 16.
162 Id.
Id. at 17.
I5, d. at 18.
Id. at 19-22.
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DEA.' 66
While squeezing a backpack in an overhead luggage rack is
perfectly lawful, the Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist,
still held that it was an unjustified search.17 It would follow,
therefore, that the consent which the suspects gave the agent
was a fruit of that unjustified search.'68 The majority distin-
guished Ciraolo and Riley, which "involved only visual, as op-
posed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive inspection is
simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."'69 The
Court then alikened the frisk of the bag to another "great in-
dignity":170 a Terry pat-down of the outer clothing.' 7'
Passengers do, the Court conceded, run certain risks regarding
the way their luggage will be handled by passengers and carri-
er personnel.'72 But what Agent Cantu did "far exceeded the
casual contact [petitioner] could have expected from other pas-
sengers. " 173
The distinction that the four dissenters and concurring
Justice O'Connor had acknowledged in Riley-that even when
police are in a lawful vantage point, still they conduct a
"search" when they act in a way that few people
would' 74-must have somehow succeeded in introducing
through Bond a new, or, I should say, renewed, version of Katz.
But still, how would we know how routine or non-routine what
Agent Cantu did should be established? How would we know,
apart from the sort of laborious questioning of others that Pro-
fessor Slobogin performed? What were the bases of the Court's
conclusions in Bond? How Bond squares with other sorts of
risk analyses-that of undercover agents in whom you misplace
confidence, of your bank or phone company letting others pe-
18 Id. at 24.
... Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
18 Id. at 336 n.1.
188 Id, at 337.
170 Id.
171 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
17' Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
' Brief for the Petitioner at 18-19, United States v. Bond, 529 U.S.
334 (2000) (No. 98-9349) (internal quotations omitted).
74 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-68 (1989).
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ruse your records, of overflight in helicopters or fixed-wing
aircraft in public navigable airspace, or that your friend's car
that you are riding in will be unjustifiably searched-remains
opaque. We get little elaboration in these decisions, though the
facts certainly are representative of the sorts of observations
that police make from lawful vantage points.
That Justice Breyer would dissent in Bond, taking the
position that this was a non-search, should be unsurprising,
given the sort of extended risk-analysis he applied to Officer
Thielen's lurking around outside Thompson's apartment in
Carter.7 ' Writing for himself and Justice Scalia in Bond,
Breyer cites the same cases as Rehnquist does for the majority,
and even alludes to O'Connor's concurrence in Riley,17 which
I remind you asks whether the "intrusion is a 'sufficiently rou-
tine part of modern life" to qualify as a non-search.'77 What
the majority and dissenters differ on is ultimately a complicat-
ed empirical question: whether baggage routinely gets explored
the way the suspects' bags did here. In concluding that it does,
Breyer relied on the lower court's ruling, plus three snippets
from newspaper articles and a Seventh Circuit opinion that
address how luggage in overhead bins gets "shoved,"
"crammed," "recrammed," and "rearranged."7 ' I am not going
to get into whether passengers with bad manners should set
our expectations. But I am quite convinced that none of these
descriptions of what happens to luggage, however-true or
not-captures the mode in which Agent Cantu was operating.
And how, exactly are they different?
IV. THE ROLE OF INTENTIONS IN
FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
I begin with an important bit of common ground in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Bond: both cite Whren v.
United States79 and other cases" for the proposition that
... Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).
178 Bond, 529 U.S. at 341.
177 Id.; see also Riley, 488 U.S. at 453.
178 Bond, 529 U.S. at 340.
179 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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"the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrele-
vant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the
Fourth Amendment." 8' Yet no one would dispute, I take it,
that the intentions of the suspect or search victim do matter in
determining whether the officer's actions violate the Fourth
Amendment. Katz can be read to say that to be a search victim,
you must "have demonstrated an intention to keep activities
and things... private ... "18 For example, when Katz de-
posited a dime in the public pay phone and closed the door, he
demonstrated an intention to exclude the "uninvited ear," even
though he did not succeed, given that the government-installed
listening device intercepted his conversations."
What the Court repeatedly insists upon is that a police
officer's intentions play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis.
Its fullest explication of this notion appears in Whren: the case
that both the majority and dissent cited for that very proposi-
tion in Bond. Whren purported to solve the so-called pretext
problem. The solution, in turn, relied heavily on the Court's
view of the role that intentions play in Fourth Amendment law.
I am hoping that a fairly close reading of Whren will pay divi-
dends in our arriving at discovery or agreement on whether
police intentions or motivations (as the Court is fond of putting
it) have anything to tell us about what constitutes a search.
A. What Is a Pretext?
To say that the action claimed is not the action that oc-
curred is not to describe the action as pretextual, except in a
too-extravagant sense. With pretexts, the action is not feigned.
What is concealed is a special reason, a motive: what is con-
"o Bond, 529 U.S. at 339 n.2 (citing California v. Ciraolo 476 U.S. 207, 212
(1986)); Bond, 529 U.S. at 342 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1987)).
181 Bond, 529 U.S. at 339 n.2 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 814); Bond, 529 U.S.
at 342 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813).
1" See LaFave supra note 125, at 299 (citing Eric Dean Bender, Note, The
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 725, 753-54 (1985)); see also supra note 90.
183 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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cealed is something in the world to be achieved or set up by the
action, something that normally would not strike someone as
the upshot of the action. A pretext is a criticism we make of an
action that has a motive that is, like all motives, at odds in
some way with the action: the motive for the generous action
toward the fragile relative is to inherit under the will. The
motive could be greed (because greed is directed at some-
thing-here, the money that the will would make available). If
the generous action is just plain generous without such
directedness, then it is nonsense to speak in terms of motive,
though there may be reasons for the generosity (for example,
feeling good about oneself). But such reasons are not motives if
they are psychological or inner," even though we tend to
think of motives as inner states rather than as explanations of
something to be attained in the world by a certain course of ac-
tion.185 And while it is common among psychologists to sug-
gest that all actions have motives (or are motivated), 8 ' in fact
we use the word "motive" only infrequently in ordinary
speech."8 7 We use the word only in reference to actions we
feel the need to assess, to make sense of.1 8' Among those ac-
tions that do have reasons, not all reasons are necessarily di-
rected. Considerateness or punctuality, for example, are rea-
sons for actions, yet they are not motives; they have no aim, no
directedness; they are not setting anything up.1 s9
Thus, references to motives come up in moral discourse
where we need to make sense of an action. If we say, "what
was his motive?" it must be because it looks to us as though
'"' See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REV. 17,
72-73 (1991).
15 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[SIending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of
police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial re-
sources.")
18 R.S. PETERS, THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATION 31 (R.F. Holland ed., 1958).
I87 Id. at 28; N.S. Sutherland, Motives as Explanations, 68 MIND 145, 153
(1959).
1' PETERS, supra note 186, at 29.
1.. Id. at 32.
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the action had to be directed at something untoward, but we
cannot figure out what it was. When we say that Macbeth's
motive in killing Duncan was ambition, we are not referring to
a feeling or some internal perturbation of Macbeth; 0 instead,
the motive of ambition refers to some other actions, some other
ends to be attained by the killing, whether or not the actions
are known to him."' Likewise, if a man looks pleased when
praised for something trivial, or upset when mildly criticized,
we can say he is vain, but we cannot say vanity is his motive
for being pleased when praised.192 Vanity may explain certain
actions, but it cannot be considered a motive for them."3 Pre-
text is, therefore, an inquiry into a motive that the actor is cov-
ering up. Any actor, once put on the spot by being questioned
about his motives, will either confirm or dispel our suspicions
by going on record and offering a reason for the action or deny-
ing having any reason at all. If we accept that the action had
no motive, or perhaps had no reason whatsoever (as in "I just
did it" or "I just felt like doing it"),"" then the action cannot
be pretextual. Thus "pretext" is the term we apply to an action
that we conclude was directed in an unconventional or unto-
ward way that the actor was aware of, regardless of whether he
is willing to admit to it. Put slightly differently, if after con-
fronting the explanation for the action, we cannot accept the
action as conventional or ordinary, then we may be inclined to
call it a pretext. For example, we may say: "Your motive in
marrying her was greed; you married her for her money." If the
accused in such a pinch were to respond: "No, I married for
love," to that we may respond: "No, you are incapable of love.
The marriage is for you just a pretext for moneymaking." That
is to say, love is the conventional, ordinary reason for marriage,
but it is not the reason for this one. Accordingly, pretext is a
way of criticizing an action that had a motive that is incompati-
190 Gudel, supra note 184, at 73.
191 Id.
192 Id.
... See RoY LAWRENCE, MOTIVE AND INTENTION: AN ESSAY IN THE APPRECIA-
TION OF ACTION 23 (1972).
" Gudel, supra note 184, at 75.
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ble with the ordinary, conventional reasons, if any, for the
action. 195
B. Pretextual Police Action
Likewise, pretextual police action occurs when police do
the right thing for the wrong reasons,'96 i.e., they perform a
lawful action with an improper motive. For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that a search of an arrestee follows auto-
matically from a lawful arrest.9 7 This bright-line rule pre-
vents the destruction of evidence and protects the arresting
officers from weapons within the arrestee's reach. 9 ' But what
happens if an officer arrests and searches someone who has
violated a law against, say, public drunkenness, when the
officer's motive in arresting is to look for obscene materials in
the arrestee's satchel?
Defense attorneys insist that obscene materials or other
evidence found on the arrestee should be suppressed on
grounds of pretext.'99 The suppression hearing, their argu-
ment runs, should demand from the arresting officer an ac-
count of his reasons for his actions: "Why did you arrest that
person then? You had no interest in enforcing the public drunk-
enness laws, did you?""° It is the trial judge's job under such
a view to decide whether the officer did the right thing (arrest
a drunk) for the wrong reason (to search for obscene materials).
If the officer did arrest the drunk just to explore for obscene
materials, defense attorneys have long argued that the trial
190 There is alternative way of seeing the matter. J.L. Austin, for example,
states that "a] pretext may be not a genuine reason or not your real reason: a
pretence may be something you are not genuinely doing or not what you are
really doing." J.L. AUSTIN, Pretending, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 18,
at 262 n.1. By this account, in the above example, the marriage would be a pre-
tence and love a pretext.
"" See John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 101
(1982).
... Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
lOB Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
199 Burkoff, supra note 196, at 72-84.
0 See James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another View-
point, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 641-43 (1985).
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judge should invalidate the otherwise lawful police action on
grounds of pretext."0' Invalidating the arrest as unconstitu-
tional would justify the exclusion of the evidence, if any, "come
at by exploitation of that illegality."2 °2
1. Whren v. United States
The viability of this defense strategy culminated in Whren
v. United States, where an unmarked police car containing two
officers and an investigator stopped two African-American
youths in a Nissan Pathfinder for some trivial traffic offens-
es.2 3 In effecting the stop, police peered into the truck and
saw in passenger Whren's lap some cocaine that was later used
to convict him and driver Brown of serious drug, not traffic, of-
fenses.24 Because it was plainclothes vice-squad officers in an
unmarked car enforcing the District of Columbia's traffic
laws-an action that their own departmental regulations pro-
hibited-Whren and Brown insisted that the traffic stop was a
pretext for a drug investigation that could not have warranted
the car stop based merely on the officers' flimsy (but accurate)
hunch that drug activity was afoot.2 °5
Though the case made it all the way to the Supreme Court,
it is unclear just what the parties or the courts take to be the
criteria of pretexts. For example, in its brief, the ACLU assert-
ed: "[Hiad the police conducted themselves in accordance with
the regulation a court could presume, subject to rebuttal, that
the search was not pretextual."216 Yet in actuality, it is not
201 See id. at 644-46.
202 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting JOHN
MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS UPON ITS DIsCOVERY OR
COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE 221 (1959)).
203 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996); see also United States v.
Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
20 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-09. "Whren was sentenced to 168 months incarcera-
tion and five years supervised release on count one, 168 months incarceration and
ten years supervised release on count two, one year imprisonment and one year
supervised release on each of counts three and four. All terms were to be served
concurrently." Whren, 53 F.3d at 373. Brown received a nearly identical sentence.
Id. at 373-74.
20. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
206 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Peti-
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the search that was even arguably pretextual; it is the traffic
stop. As for the relevance of the departmental regulations,
compliance with them would make a stronger, not weaker, case
of pretext. That is, police compliance with departmental regula-
tions would make it easier to conclude that it really was a
traffic stop, which is a necessary condition of a pretextual traf-
fic stop.
Most of the oral argument in Whren involved discussion of
a departmental regulation forbidding plainclothes officers in
unmarked cars to make traffic stops unless the traffic violation
"is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of
others." °7 To the petitioners, the police who stopped Whren,
Officers Soto, Littlejohn and Investigator Howard,0 8 violated
the Fourth Amendment because reasonable officers would not
have made a stop that their employer precluded them from
making.0 9 To this, the Court responded that all the Depart-
ment need do is have the unmarked car ask a marked car to
make the stop.210 The Court's suggestion, however, would
leave petitioners' question unanswered: How should the Fourth
Amendment, not the police, respond when the police violate
their own rules?2 1
The real payoff of a discussion of the fact that police devi-
ated from departmental regulations lies in its ability to tell us
not whether police abused their discretion (so what if they
did?), but more importantly, to tell us what they were doing.
The real relevance of their breaking their own regulations,
accordingly, is that it is a piece of evidence that bears on the
tioners at 14 n.6, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
2"7 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (citing Metropolitan Police Department, Washington,
D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2Xa)(4) (Apr. 30,
1992)).
208 Whren, 53 F.3d at 372. The Supreme Court mentioned only Officer Soto by
name. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-10.
218 See Brief for the Petitioners at 32, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(No. 95-5841); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers in Support of Petitioners at 6-7, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(No. 95-5841) (discussing the "purely objective" approach).
210 Oral Argument at 11, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
Ill See id. at 3-29.
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issue of what they were actually doing. An officer's pulling
someone over when he lacks the authority to do so does not,
without more, make the stop a traffic stop, much less a
pretextual traffic stop.
This angle was only adumbrated at oral argument, where
the interlocutors briefly touched on snippets from Soto's and
Littlejohn's testimony from the suppression hearing in
Whren.212 There, Soto testified that the truck was stopped at
a stop sign for over twenty seconds,21 though earlier, at the
preliminary hearing, he had said he did not know how long the
truck waited at the stop.214 And while Soto testified at the
suppression hearing that the truck failed to signal before turn-
ing right,"' he had made no mention of that infraction at the
preliminary hearing or in the police report.2 16 The only infrac-
tion that Soto insisted on throughout the case was that the
truck "sped off quickly," presumably after seeing the unmarked
police car perform a u-turn.2 7 But even with regard to the in-
fraction for speeding, Soto admitted at the suppression hearing
that he "wasn't going to issue a ticket to him at all."21 '8 Rath-
er, he explained, "My intention[] was to pull him over and talk
to him [about the full time and attention and speed viola-
tions]. " '29 Departmental regulations, however, prohibited oral
warnings except under narrow circumstances not present
there.2 As for Littlejohn, he never saw the stop as a re-
sponse to any traffic violations at all. For him, the delay at the
stop sign gave them reasonable suspicion, though he never
came out and said what it was that he suspected.221
212 Oral Argument at 35-38, Whren (No. 95-5841).
21 Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Whren (No. 95-5841).
214 Id. at 5 n.5.
21 Id. at 6.
218 Id. at 6 n.6.
217 Id. at 5.
218 Id. at 6-7.
2 Id. at 7 (second alteration in original).
222 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (citing Metropolitan Police Department, Washington,
D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(a)(4) (Apr. 30,
1992)).
2 Oral Argument at 39-40, Whren (No. 95-5841); Brief for the Petitioners at 6
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Oral argument brought out not only that the officers acted
contrary to departmental regulations, but also that (1) the
officers were neither in agreement nor consistent in their
claims that they observed any traffic violations, and (2) the
officers admitted that they did not intend to enforce the traffic
laws at all. And what, exactly, is the relevance of these details?
The officers' deviation from their department's own rules, along
with the way they comported themselves during the pursuit
and stop of the truck (as well as when they went on record
about the pursuit and stop in subsequent legal proceedings),
gives us an account of what they were doing. To figure out
what police were doing is a crucial matter, far more so than
why they were doing it, which is potentially interesting but
almost always doctrinally irrelevant. The real issue is whether
this was a constitutional, that is, plain view sighting of drugs
pursuant to a lawful traffic stop.2 '
In upholding the convictions, however, the Court never
fully engages the real issue, thus replicating the indirection of
the oral argument. Rather, the Court puts most of its capital
into an attempt at distinguishing earlier precedents which had
indicated that Fourth Amendment doctrine must deter
pretextual searches and seizures.223 Whatever success Whren
might have had in attempting to reconcile its prior pretext
cases, it did succeed in establishing that there is very little
room for pretext arguments in Fourth Amendment law.224 The
conclusion makes good sense; what remains mysterious is why.
To be sure, Whren's argument is hard to take too seriously,
given that it directs reviewing courts to zero in, not so much on
what police were doing (enforcing traffic laws? drug laws?
both?), but why they were doing it (to make the roads safer?
catch drug dealers? get promoted? kill time?). Petitioners' argu-
ment was that what justifies a search or seizure is not merely
whether police have a certain amount of suspicion or knowl-
n.7, Whren (No. 95-5841).
.22 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
223 Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-13.
24 Id. at 813.
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edge about whether crime is afoot-"probable cause" in Fourth
Amendment terms-but in addition, "whether a police officer,
acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason
given." 25 Indeed, the implications of suggesting that police
articulate why they decided to stop a bad driver are potentially
absurd, leading inexorably to the following: two drivers speed-
ing down the street, one of whom police believe (but not strong-
ly enough to justify a stop) is also a drug dealer.228 The impli-
cation of petitioners' argument is that in such circumstances
police should be allowed to stop only the speeder whom they do
not also suspect of some other crime. In other words, to rule in
Whren's favor would leave us with a doctrine which says, at
least to a point, that the more suspicions you have, the less
justification you have to act on them.22
In dismissing Whren's suggestion that reviewing courts ask
questions along these dead-end lines ("Why, officer, did you
stop that bad driver?"),228 the Court was on the right track in
remarking that it saw "no realistic alternative to the tradition-
al common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and
seizure."2 9 And this much is true: If Whren really had been
driving in violation of D.C. law, then police were right to stop
him. Indeed, if police saw him break traffic laws, then who
cares whether police hoped for or even expected a bonus (be it
drugs or whatever) to be realized during the stop? What mat-
ters is whether they were enforcing the traffic laws, not why.
225 Id. at 810.
22 Haddad, supra note 200, at 690; James B. Haddad, Well-Delineated Excep-
tions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 198, 211 (1977) [hereinafter Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions].
22 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 253 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Brief for the United States at 25, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(No. 95-5841) ("[It would be unreasonable to forbid a police department from
focusing its finite resources disproportionately on those observed traffic offenders
whom officers in the field suspect may also be engaged in more serious offens-
es."); Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, supra note 226, at 211.
228 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815-19.
2 Id. at 819.
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2. Pretextual or Unconstitutional? How to Tell the Difference
The happy part of Whren is the Court's insistence that
probable cause that traffic laws had been violated is the key to
any evaluation of the constitutionality of the stop and search of
the truck. The unhappy part is that the Court made no effort to
establish how we would determine that it was the probable
cause on which police were relying when they got themselves
into a position to see cocaine in Whren's lap. Nowhere does the
Court acknowledge that, even with probable cause to stop the
car, police still might have performed an unconstitutional sei-
zure to verify a hunch about drug activity rather than perform
a lawful traffic stop.
And how would we tell the difference between a lawful
traffic stop and an unlawful drug investigation? That depends
on whether what the officers claim to have done is consistent
with what was seen in the public, observable world. In other
words, it is at this point that the distinction between intentions
and motives, and their roles, should begin to reveal itself. Sup-
pose, for example, a case in which officers search a house at
night under the authority of a daytime-only search warrant,
discover evidence of crime, and claim later in the litigation that
their intent in entering the house was to make a warrantless
emergency arrest.23 That the officers did not intend to exe-
cute such an arrest is demonstrated by the fact that they ap-
plied for a search warrant for an illegal distillery, took the
warrant to the house, produced it before entering, and searched
the house after locating the suspect. This is not a pretextual,
warrantless entry to arrest; it is not a warrantless entry to
arrest at all because it lacks the characteristics of an action
directed at arresting rather than searching. As a result, any
evidence obtained in the house or on the arrestee's person
230 Haddad, supra note 200, at 655-57 (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493 (1958)). This hypothetical is based very loosely on Jones, which in actuality
was a much closer case, far too close to demonstrate much of anything. There,
despite what the majority found, police really did have reason to believe that
Jones, whom they knew was running an illegal still, was inside at the time of
the entry. See Jones, 357 U.S. at 500-03 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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should be excluded. 3 ' Indeed, this is an unconstitutional war-
rantless entry to search even if there was probable cause to
believe the search victim was a dangerous felon. Unless police
conducted themselves at the house in a way that is consistent
with an intention to rely on the doctrine they now cite as the
authority for their actions, then it is not so much that police
were arresting pretextually (so what if they were?), but that
they were searching unconstitutionally.
If it really was a warrantless entry to arrest, then who
cares why it was performed? What matters is what the police
were doing. Did they have probable cause that a serious crime
had been committed? Would getting a warrant have posed a
danger to themselves or the public? Did they enter the premis-
es without a warrant and commit themselves in a way that
indicated that they were looking to get their hands on a dan-
gerous person, not for evidence squirreled away in the
house?232 If so, then they have performed a lawful, warrant-
less entry to arrest a dangerous criminal,233 and any reason
or motive external to the action that they might have had is
irrelevant.
Once we insinuate the enforcement of traffic laws into the
Fourth Amendment, however, determining what police really
were doing becomes harder. Take, for example, the case of a
male officer who stops an attractive female motorist who sus-
pects that she has been stopped for his amusement, not to
make the roads safer. Of course it is always open to the officer
to invent a traffic offense, but the motorist in such a case has
worries quite apart from why the traffic stop occurred, that is,
quite apart from whether it was pretextual. Indeed, to claim
that the stop was pretextual is incompatible with a claim that
the police later invented the justification for the stop. Although
police perjury is far from trivial,2" with pretexts the claim is
231 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
23 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
233 Id.
21 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and
Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997); Christopher
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that police are lying not about what they have done, but about
why they have done it.
The only concern here is with suspects whom police do
have some justification in stopping. What the motorist who
really is a traffic offender is expressing when she complains
about her encounter with the overly friendly officer is either (1)
despite facts justifying some police action, it is not that justi-
fied action which police were really taking; or (2) despite facts
justifying this police action, the action had a "social" motive.
While these two objections to what police have done tend to be
treated as though they are coterminous, they are not. The first
objection is to call the stop unconstitutional; the second objec-
tion is to call it pretextual. Pretexts may be dead as means of
depicting police illegality, but the core of what many defen-
dants claiming pretext are getting at is not, if only because of a
snag in distinguishing pretextual from unconstitutional police
action. That is, what remains open to defendants who could
justifiably have been stopped, but who question the conditions
of the stop anyway, is to argue that police were not doing what
they said they were doing: their actions (regardless of their mo-
tives, if motives there be) did not have the intention that police
claim at the suppression hearing to have had on the street.
Assuming the motorist was violating the traffic laws, there
must be some procedures we can use to reveal what this
officer's motives were. If the officer approached the car and
asked the driver out for a date, then it was not a pretextual
traffic stop; it was an unconstitutional one, that is, it was not a
traffic stop at all, even with probable cause. It could have been
a traffic stop, but the officer chose to conduct a social stop in-
stead. If, however, the officer asked her for her license and
registration, advised her of what she had done and issued her a
ticket or warning, then we can conclude that the officer acted,
in the public, observable world, like someone who intended to
enforce the traffic code. In other words, he was enforcing the
traffic code.
Slobogin, Testifying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
1037 (1996).
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When I discussed this issue with some San Diego police
officers who had been admonished for mixing the personal with
the professional in this very way, I received a range of respons-
es, which included this one: "So you mean that if I give her a
ticket first and then ask her out it's okay, but if I ask her out
first then it's not?" The answer to this is, of course, "Yes, from
a Fourth Amendment standpoint." In other words, there is
little more we can ask when taking positions on what has oc-
curred in the public, observable world than that people act in a
way that can be reconciled with their claims about their own
actions. (If I am always nice to you-I treat you well, attentive-
ly, even tenderly-then it makes little difference whether I
"really" like you.)
Yet to require only that the officer have the intent to rely
on the doctrine in question may not sufficiently protect against
pretexts or abuse of the doctrine. Professor Haddad suggests
that when a doctrine is intolerably susceptible to abuse-to
pretextual police action-the doctrine should be altered to elim-
inate that susceptibility.235 The Court recognized as much in
Chimel v. California by putting a stop to thorough searches of
residences incident to the arrest of occupants.236 Before
Chimel, officers were conducting arrests at suspects' residences
and converting those arrests into exploratory searches of the
residences without first obtaining search warrants.23 7 The ar-
rests, one could say, were pretextual means of realizing the
motive of ransacking the house. Unhappy with the hazards
posed by a doctrine that permitted such abuse of the power to
arrest, the Court limited the permissible scope of a search
incident to arrest to the arrestee and his grab-area.23
This approach, which Haddad dubs "the hard-choice ap-
proach,"239 has the appeal of avoiding intractable attempts at
uncovering the motive or motives behind the action, in favor of
23 Haddad, supra note 200, at 652-53.
238 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-68 (1969).
237 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
238 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764-68.
2' Haddad, supra note 200, at 651-53.
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changing the law in order to take away the incentive to stage
pretextual police actions. Take, for example, a hypothetical of
Haddad's:
Suppose that defense counsel claims that the police have
executed a dated but valid traffic arrest warrant as a pretext
to enter a narcotics suspect's house, hoping to discover heroin
either in plain view or within the scope of a search incident to
arrest.
One approach would be to narrow the scope of the under-
lying power: the right to enter a home to execute an arrest
warrant. The Supreme Court could declare that arrest war-
rants expire after a certain period of time, at least where the
police efforts to execute the warrant have lapsed. Or the
Court could make a less drastic alteration in [F]ourth
[Ajmendment law by declaring that after a period of time,
absent continuous diligent effort to execute a misdemeanor
arrest warrant, the warrant, though still valid for some pur-
poses, would not authorize entry into a suspect's home. The
Court would reason that if authorities place such a low priori-
ty on a prompt arrest, the governmental interest does not
outweigh the individual's right to be free from police entry
into his home at the nearly unbridled discretion of the
police.240
In other words, Haddad's hard-choice approach, itself
traceable to Justice Brennan's dissent in a 1960 case,241
would treat the pretext problem as resolvable doctrinally: not
by condemning a given police search or seizure as pretextual,
but by changing the background rules against which police act.
Quibbling over whether the entry was a pretext fails to tell us
much, even if the real reason for the action (why the officer
was doing that) rather than what the action was (the intention
of the action) was easily accessible to us. Accordingly, when a
pretext problem arises, if we do not like what police are doing
in such cases, Haddad would have us ask: Did police demon-
strate the intent to rely on the doctrine in question? And if
240 Id. at 652 (footnotes omitted).
241 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248-56 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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their having done so does not dispel our concerns about abuse
of the doctrine, then we should consider altering the doctrine.
Whren, however, is a flinty case, resistant to evaluating
what it was that police were really doing. Assume that the
traffic violations alluded to by Officer Soto did occur. When
Soto and Littlejohn took the stand at the pretrial hearing
where Whren and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine, one
could have asked: What, if anything, was said between the
officers before the stop? Did they discuss the Nissan's erratic
movements? Did they discuss their then-unsubstantiated suspi-
cions about drug activity? Did the officers explain the point of
the stop to the driver? If not, then why not? Was it due to their
being distracted? By what? Seeing the drugs? Did the officers
ultimately ticket the driver? Why not? Because it seemed trivi-
al compared with what was discovered? By questioning the
intentions of the officers in this manner, we get, in their elabo-
ration of what they were doing, a chance to respond to their
going on record when they tell us, and expect us to rely on
them when they tell us, what their intentions were. And de-
spite what the Supreme Court may say, this inquiry into inten-
tions is a way of determining what happened and is not meant
to be a way of peeking into what went on behind what hap-
pened.
In Whren's case, even if the police did initiate a traffic
stop, in light of their prompt plain-view sighting of cocaine,
there was good reason for their not following through on that
original intention or plan. The traffic stop might well have been
the original plan, but it might have dropped out when, after
undertaking that original plan, police saw that they had their
hands on some drug offenders. 42 In this situation, their fail-
ure to follow through-their failure to treat this as a traffic
stop-by no means demonstrates that the stop was, at its in-
ception, a drug investigation, though it may certainly give us
pause.
2 Cf. Haddad, supra note 200, at 678 n.178 (citing cases that hold that a
traffic stop need not culminate in a citation or warning in order to be constitu-
tional).
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The difference between this case and the case of the officer
who used the traffic laws to improve his social life has some-
thing to do with what changes in plan, what sorts of distrac-
tions, can count in our attempt to come to grips with what
action the officer was performing. In other words, we could ask:
Was Whren a drug investigation (masquerading as a traffic
stop), and was the officer who stopped the attractive motorist
embarking on a social adventure (also masquerading as a traf-
fic stop)? When the officers converted Whren's traffic stop into
a drug investigation, their overlooking the traffic offenses
makes good sense (though it would lead to their being given a
hard time in the witness box at the suppression hearing). After
all, the plain view discovery of evidence that could lead to de-
cades of imprisonment is just the sort of distraction to which
we may expect law enforcers to yield when the plan began as a
stop that could by itself culminate in no more than the issu-
ance of a citation and summons.
But then why suggest that the failure to pursue the traffic
infractions in Whren "may certainly give us pause"? Because
that is a response that is open whenever someone says that
they were doing something-here, enforcing the traffic
laws-that is at least arguably at odds with the way they com-
ported themselves. But with the officer who asks the motorist
for a date, we would likely be a good deal more skeptical about
the basis of the distraction. Why be distracted by that? And
even if the distraction is quite literally natural, that does not
adequately explain actually yielding to it, not in the context of
policing. Indeed, the basis of the distraction in such a case is
trivial when compared to that in Whren: trivial, again, in light
of the objectives of policing. And even if the officer who asked
the motorist for a date really did observe a traffic offense and
really saw himself as committed, at first, to performing a traffic
stop, all we have to evaluate the action is what we see in the
public, observable world, including of course his account of it.
While it is perfectly plausible that the officer who asked the
motorist for a date was every bit as committed to carrying out
the original plan as the officers in Whren were, when his ac-
tions suggest a social call, it is an account that is more likely to
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be rejected, given that it is hard to count desire as a distraction
in that context. Such an account would have no real sway, not
in light of what could pass for a commitment to enforce the
traffic laws in the first instance 43
3. The Role of Intentions in Fourth Amendment Analysis
The procedures I suggest for unraveling the problem posed
by pretextual police action entail questioning police so that we
may take a position on what they were doing (confronting their
intentions) as opposed to why they were doing it (confronting
their reasons, their motives, their purposes). Whren's weakness
is not that it kills off pretext claims-that is really no weak-
ness at all-but that it threatens to kill off any meaningful
evaluation of what police do. For instance, at one point the
Whren Court remarks that "[slubjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."2"
For reasons that remain foggy, this is a phrase of which the
Court is particularly fond.145 And it is safe to say the parties
only compound the problem.
2 46
But what could this utterance possibly mean? In this con-
text the word "subjective" is borderline nonsense, as it must be
whenever used to modify "intention" or any other term of
inculpation or exculpation. In other words, there is no such
243 But cf. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, supra note 226, at 205 (suggest-
ing that evidence discovered against a traffic offender who was stopped as a pre-
text for asking the driver out on a date would be less likely to be challenged by
defense counsel as a pretext than would evidence discovered against a traffic of-
fender who was stopped as a pretext for a drug investigation).
24 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 123 (2001) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Indianapo-
lis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338
n.2 (2000); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 604 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998); Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 38 (1996).
246 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 15, Whren (No. 95-5841) ("An inqui-
ry into whether an officer's action was 'pretextual' is inherently an inquiry into
his subjective intent."). A Westlaw search of the term "subjective-intent!" in the
United States Supreme Court database returns eighty-one cases.
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thing as a subjective intention. Subjective as opposed to what?
Objective? What would the difference denote exactly? Could one
imagine any specific application of utterances such as, "His
subjective intention was X but his objective intention was Y"? If
so, then what would it be? His intention according to him (sub-
jective) as opposed to his intention according to others whom
we may identify through laborious questioning (objective)? In
other words, is it to say that a subjective intention is a claim
you make about your intentions, but an objective intention is a
claim someone else makes about your intentions? If so, then
what makes others' claims objective? Their distance? That is,
their ability to know how things are with us better than we do
ourselves? So there really are two kinds of intentions? That
cannot be the law (or the grammar of "intention" either).
When we refer to intentions, we are trying to make sense
out of an action in a context where subjective and objective
have no specific application. Indeed, speaking in terms of inten-
tions as subjective or objective plays into one of the great
myths of legal notions of responsibility: that references to in-
tentions are references to something inside us.247 Intentions
are said to be subjective because they are secret "mental
states," which can only be inferred by others (objectively)
through close observation of behavior.248 Take this perfectly
247 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989); United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716-17 (1983).
The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a
man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as
much a fact as anything else.
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716-17 (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483
(1885)).
24 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 397 (1995).
Judges and juries do not, as a precondition to fmding that a killing was
intentional, peek into the defendant's mind in search of the required
intent. They look at the evidence of what the defendant did and try to
infer from it whether there was advance planning or some other indica-
tion of a high probability of success, whether there was concealment of
evidence or other indicia of likely escape, and whether the circumstances
of the crime argue a likelihood of repetition . ...
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conventional and representative account from a leading book of
criminal law theory where legal philosopher Michael Moore
holds: "My own intentions are usually known to me in a way
different from how they are known to a third-person observer,
the latter having to make behavioral inferences since he lacks
my first-person experience." 49 Moore says we must infer, a
second-rate form of knowing, but if close enough attention is
paid to the data, to the way the body moves and what the mind
must have willed it to do, then we can discover this thing
called the "intention."
This psychologizing of intentions, however, misses out on
why we talk about intentions:
Descriptions of mental events or processes are not accept-
able as answers to questions about what our intentions are. A
request for our intentions is not a request for a description of
something inside us, but a request for us to perform a certain
act that requires us to go on record or to commit ourselves in
a certain way that justifies the reliance of other persons on
what we profess our intentions to be.
It is not, then, that intentions are difficult to observe or
to have "direct evidence" of. Intentions simply are not the
sorts of things that can be observed, any more than one can
observe the number five (not some particular written or print-
ed instance of the number five, but the number itself). This
does not mean they are necessarily hidden; it only means that
the concept of "observation" has no obvious application to
them. When we say something like, '"The intentions of anoth-
er cannot be directly observed," we have no coherent idea of
what it would mean to "observe another's intention." If any-
thing is meant by this phrase at all, it probably is something
along the lines of "observe his intention as he himself ob-
serves it." But there is no such thing as this; there is no thing
called "the intention" we observe by introspection just before
every action we take. Intentions are not observed, either by
ld.
249 MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw 94 (1993).
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ourselves or by others.
We use the language of intentions, and impute intentions
to persons, as a way of making human actions intelligible to
ourselves. We do not make actions intelligible to ourselves by
adverting to an inner event that preceded that action. Our
interest in human actions is not usually in how they were
produced, but in how they can be more fully understood. Be-
cause this is what the attribution of intentions does, the lan-
guage of intentions has reference to the public, observable
world, not to an inaccessible world of inner events.2"
Professor Paul Gudel offered this as a response to the Supreme
Court's so-called "mixed motives" problem in employment dis-
crimination cases,251 but it has point in any context where
questions of responsibility arise. References to intentions are
made in order to limit responsibility by demanding that the
accused go on record, typically by proffering an excuse. That is,
in asking what your intentions were, we are asking for an
explanation of your actions, but we are not asking for you to
make reports about something inside you, be it a mental state
or any other sort of internal perturbation.
So if we get rid of that misleading referent-subjective-we
are left with the following utterance: "[IIntentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."52
Now what? Could the Court really emphasize that probable
250 Gudel, supra note 184, at 84-85 (footnotes omitted) (second and third em-
phases added).
251 Id. at 18.
[Ilmagine a supervisor who is biased against women and who actively
dislikes dealing with women in the workplace. Imagine also that one of
his employees is a woman who has her failings as an employee-perhaps
she is chronically absent from work or achieves consistently low perfor-
mance levels. At some point, the supervisor fires her.
Now imagine that the woman sues the employer for sex discrimina-
tion and at trial introduces evidence that her supervisor was biased
against women. The employer introduces evidence that the woman was
fired because she was a poor employee. This is what the courts have
called a "mixed motives" case. How do we sort out the relationship be-
tween the facts submitted by both sides and the employer's decision?
Id. 252 See Whren, 517 U.s. at 813.
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cause to stop the car was what made the stop impervious to
criticism in Whren, but say at once that what police intended to
do is irrelevant? But what makes probable cause critical to the
constitutionality of searches and seizures is that it is strongly
suggestive that police act on that knowledge, that is, they act
with a certain intention. If the police officers' account of their
intentions - their going on record and telling us that we can
rely on them when they tell us what they were doing - is
irrelevant, then how would we be able to take positions on
what it was that they were doing? How would we be able to tell
that it was the traffic violations that occasioned the stop and
not some unsubstantiated hunch, or racism (a reason that does
matter),253 or spite (a reason that, rightly or wrongly, does
not)? Without confronting their intentions, we would know it
was a stop sure enough, but we would not know if it was a
traffic stop, a stop to investigate drug activity, a stop to kill
time, or whatever. In other words, we cannot know what to
make of the action once it is called into question unless we take
a stab at getting the accused to go on record about how things
were with him. Of course the intentions of police matter; inves-
tigating intentions and finding out what was done are on the
same level, part of the same enterprise; indeed, they are the
same enterprise. When we get to the suppression hearing in
criminal cases, questioning police about their intentions is
essential to our evaluation of what they have done. Otherwise
we would not know how to respond to what happened. But to
say, as the Court did in Whren, and has reiterated since, that
the intentions of police are irrelevant,254 is to say that our in-
terest in what police have done is irrelevant. And that much is
wrong.
But in this particular and peculiar utterance, it is evident
what the Court is getting at, or more accurately, what it is
revealing: a view of intentions which casts them as internal
states, the content of which is inferred through close observa-
" Id. ("We of course agree . . . that the Constitution prohibits the selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.").
24 See supra note 245.
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tion. Yet if intentions are part of the secret, subjective selves,
then how can we ever avoid being held hostage by lies and
indirection ("No one can tell me what I was thinking!") except
by, in the Whren Court's words, "root[ing] out... subjective
intent through ostensibly objective means" 5' (whatever that
means). By making this recommendation, what the Court is
responding to is the difficulty in knowing others, that difficulty
accounting for the development of a doctrine that makes the
hidden, secret selves-the "state of mind"5 ' of oth-
ers-irrelevant whenever possible. This, however, badly
mischaracterizes what an intention is, which is simply a device,
a way of talking about human action, for making action intelli-
gible where there is some reason to question what was done.
All this seems to only glance off the Court. When the Court
elaborates in Whren that "the Fourth Amendment's concern
with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in cer-
tain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent[,]"2"' it is
hard to get a picture of what, in the Court's view, would consti-
tute an action without an intention, subjective or otherwise. By
definition, an action has an intention."8 If you are pushed or
stung by a bee or are having a seizure, then you are not acting
at all; if you harm someone by mistake or accident, then you
have acted, though there your intentions in one way or another
misfire: you take the wrong one or something befalls. In other
words, an action without an intention is a happening or an
occurrence, but not an action.259 You perform an action inten-
255 Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.
25 Id. ("Instead of asking whether the individual officer had the proper state
of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect, whether (based on general
police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of
mind.").
257 Id.; see also Kenneth Gavsie, Note, Making the Best of "Whren": The Prob-
lems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV.
385, 387 n.22 (1998) ("[Plrobable cause for any traffic violation will suffice for a
reasonable stop regardless of an officer's true intentions.").
25 See J.L. AUSTIN, Three Ways of Spilling Ink, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS,
supra note 18, at 280-81 ("I may 'have no purpose (whatsoever)' in doing some-
thing, just as I may take no care. But I don't 'have no intention (whatsoever)' in
doing something.").
259 See CARLOS J. MOYA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 12 (1990).
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tionally only if you have some idea of what you are doing, when
you are putting yourself to whatever is realized.26 ° J.L. Austin
captures what he calls this "most subtle ... notion[]" of inten-
tion when he writes:
I must be supposed to have as it were a plan, an operation-
order or something of the kind on which I'm acting, which I
am seeking to put into effect, carry out in action: only of
course nothing necessarily or, usually, even faintly, so full-
blooded as a plan proper. When we draw attention to this
aspect of action, we use the words connected with inten-
tion.26'
As Stanley Cavell puts it, "[Y]ou can't be intending to do a
thing if you don't know you're doing it, or rather don't know
how what you are doing could have that consequence (if you
didn't know about the child, you can't have intended to frighten
it)."262 Thus, a police officer who does not mean to do any-
thing at all is not acting, period. Accordingly, "in assessing
official responsibility for police acting as police, it makes good
sense to require that police intend to investigate crime or en-
force laws before they may be held responsible in their investi-
gative or enforcement capacities." 263 Likewise, when we are
confronting the question of whether a search or seizure is con-
stitutional, we cannot get an accurate picture of what was done
without confronting what it was that police were putting them-
selves to. A traffic stop is characterized as such not merely by
the fact that police pull someone over intentionally; that would
demonstrate only that it was a stop. But by claiming to fore-
close on inquiries into police intentions, the Supreme Court
threatens to foreclose on our telling the difference between a
plan (though nothing so full-blooded as a plan) to effect a traf-
fic stop, a drug investigation, or an instance of harassment,
260 AUSTIN, supra note 258, at 283.
261 Id. (footnote omitted).
262 STANLEY CAVELL, A Matter of Meaning It, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE
SAY?, supra note 16, at 233.
26 Daniel Yeager, "Oops!": Inadvertence, Intentionality, and the Police, 24
SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 157, 157 (1997).
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racial or otherwise. Evaluating the constitutionality of the stop
entails coming to grips with the officers' account of their inten-
tions in the context of the other facts available. And to the
extent that the Court says otherwise-and they do-is more
than a little misleading.
C. The Role of Intentions in the Law of Search
1. In Theory: Seeing and Snooping
If I have made some headway in describing and lightly
criticizing the Court's view of the role of intentions in Fourth
Amendment law, then I'd like to put myself to mapping this
discussion specifically on to the Court's view of Katz. Please
recall that both the majority and dissent in Bond proclaimed
that intentions are irrelevant in Fourth Amendment analy-
sis. 64 Recall as well that in addition to citing Whren, both
majority and dissent cited for that proposition two cases in
which the Court held that no search occurred. In the first,
Ciraolo, it was Chief Justice Burger's position for the majority
that the fact that police-not commercial or recreational air
travelers-were flying above Ciraolo's marijuana plot made no
constitutional difference in determining whether a search oc-
curred.26 In the second, United States v. Dunn, Justice
White's majority opinion cited Ciraolo to support his conclusion
that the question of what constitutes a protected curtilage as
opposed to an unprotected open field is invariant to the inten-
tions of police.2 6 More precisely, White ruled that shining a
flashlight into a barn that was obscured by fishnetting (and to
which access was impeded by a fence and a locked gate at the
end of a driveway) is not made a search by the intentions of
police to discover evidence.267 The pertinent utterance from
Ciraolo on which White relies in Dunn is:
We based our holding [in Ciraolol on the premise that the
26 See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
26 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
2 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1987).
267 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
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Fourth Amendment 'has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a
home on public thoroughfares." Importantly, we deemed it
irrelevant that the police observation at issue was directed
specifically at the identification of marijuana plants growing
on an area protected by the Fourth Amendment."
What kind of argument is this? To make intentions irrele-
vant to a discussion like this requires that we describe the
activity in question at the highest level of generality imagin-
able. In other words, we would have to describe the activity in
question as "flying," from which it follows that police investiga-
tors, like recreational and commercial travelers, are in the
most generalized sense doing the same thing: flying. But every-
one knows that flying and spying aren't the same thing. I sup-
pose (if we felt the need to, if we felt staked in saying so) we
could call it "flying for the purpose of spying." But isn't that
what spying is? (These two "elements" are here no more sever-
able than the chicken's crossing the road and the "purpose" of
getting to the other side: their intimacy or non-severability
explains why it is a funny joke). Escaping from police and going
for a personal best in a ten kilometer race both instantiate
"running," but we would no more describe those actions in
merely that way than we would describe shooting a gun at a
range and at an enemy merely as "shooting." Indeed, even
when a shooting is admittedly directed at or intended to kill
another, the applicability of the defense of justification turns
entirely on the intention of the shooter: it is self-defense if the
shooter intended to defend himself from a deadly or near-dead-
ly threat (and had grounds for sensing such a threat), but it is
murder if the shooter intends to kill someone who poses or
seems to pose no such threat. A murder leads at a minimum to
a lengthy imprisonment while a justified killing can lead to a
medal, yet both are, at the highest level of abstraction, "shoot-
ings." That the intention alone explains why we treat these
vaguely similar actions differently strikes me, though appar-
26 Id. at 304-05 (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213) (citation omitted).
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ently not the Supreme Court, as manifest.
As I argued above in my discussion of Whren, the intention
is what characterizes the action as an action at all, as opposed
to a mere occurrence or happening. Intentions are never irrele-
vant to ascriptions of responsibility, which is what inquiries
into whether a search took place are: if it was a search, then
police would have to justify it by reference to a sufficient
amount of antecedent suspicion. Absent sufficient suspicion or
the intention to act on that suspicion, suppressing evidence so
derived would be an expression of our holding the government
responsible for causing an unjustified harm.
Inadvertent revelations or discoveries are always read on a
different moral plane than intentional ones. That is, just as one
is not being lewd when one undresses unaware that the cur-
tains are open, neither is one being nosy when one overhears a
conversation or reads correspondence that was sent to him or
her inadvertently or by mistake. Bringing something about that
was outside your plan is something most of us would forgive
you for. I recall a friend (now a law dean) recounting how she
once had a houseguest, who, while my friend was at work,
helped herself to a quick perusal of the high-school yearbook off
the shelf. When my friend returned, she was greeted with: "you
looked so sad in high school." I suppose we could, if you insist,
describe the friend's act as "reading," but that boiled-down
description doesn't quite capture the action, not at least in the
way I assess it. But since here the act of choosing that book
was directed at a discovery about her host's past, we would ask
(as Scott Sundy would ask about Greenwood's garbage): why
look at that book, then, there? I suppose at this point it is plau-
sible to say: you should have locked the book in the attic or
taken the precaution of enjoining your guest from looking at it.
These are plausible responses, but as responses go, they are
evasive if not weak. What is being evaded is an acknowledge-
ment of what sort of action had been performed: reading or
snooping? There must be a way to tell the difference, and in a
legal regime wedded to privacy, telling the difference between
reading and snooping-between seeing and spying-is the
point.
[Vol. 74
OVERCOMING HIDDENNESS
2. In Action: Is Spying Really All That Bad?
The privacy approach, much better than the trespass ap-
proach, recognized that many governmental attempts to ferret
out evidence-searches-would take place when the search
victim is present, but the government is not. That is, one could
say that all sorts of eavesdroppings, electronic or otherwise,
occur in the search victim's present, but not in his or her pres-
ence. This type of sur eillance, which lacks the sort of supervi-
sion over the body that Foucault insists is such a crucial aspect
of what makes imprisonment punitive, invades, but it does not
coerce.69 That it does not coerce in no way trivializes the
wrong, though it does potentially trivialize the harm, at least
in those cases in which the search victim not only has no felt
sense of being observed, but even never learns of it at all, if
only because insufficient evidence on which to commence a
prosecution is gathered.
It bears repeating that this is not to discount the wrong or
harm caused by a search that occurs outside the presence of
the search victim, that is, where the search victim is absent
during the police entry or, if present, is unaware that he or she
is being watched. Thus, I am not recommending that spying is
preferable in any way to an unjustified face-to-face encounter,
which may in fact involve coercion against the body of the
search victim incident to the assertion of authority over the
searched area. In other words, somewhat unusual decisions
such as Michigan v. Summers... demonstrate that the author-
ity which police have over a place derivative of their right to
search can also entail an authority over the body of the search
victim as well to facilitate the search, prevent escape or the
destruction of evidence, or prevent the suspect's obtaining a
weapon that could be used against the officers before, during,
or after the execution of the search.2"' Without belaboring a
comparison between the powers to search and arrest, it strikes
'0 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-
230 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books, 2d ed. 1995) (1975).
270 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
271 See generally id.
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me as uncontroversial to say that searches that occur outside
the presence of the search victim are just as wrong as coercive
encounters if, to lift a term of Yale Kamisar's, "comparative
reprehensibility"2 72 matters. The harm could conceivably be
just as lasting, too, I'm sure. But that, too, is of little moment
to me, at least now. What does currently strike me as staked is
how the harm when a search occurs in the presence of the
search victim differs from when a search occurs outside the
presence of the search victim, quite apart from the difference
that may arise out of those instances when searching an area
allows for (doctrinally) seizing, arresting, or otherwise coercing
(pushing around) the search victim. Or, as Judge Posner has
stated the distinction, when police tap your telephone (as op-
posed to burst in on you when you are home), there is an inva-
sion of privacy, but "Itihere is no interruption-no breaking in
on your solitude or concentration."" 3
Consider, for example, United States v. Knotts.274 In that
case, the seller of a can of chloroform allowed police to place an
electronic beeper in the can so they could track it and its pos-
sessors. 2 The Court held that the use of the beeper was not
a search of the can or the car in which it traveled because the
beeper did nothing that visual surveillance could not.2 71 In
fact, the driver knew that police were following him, so one
could perhaps say that the "stalking" of the driver coerced him
into driving evasively. 7 Indeed, Bill Stuntz made this very
point nearly a decade ago in the Michigan Law Review, where
he complained that privacy was over-regulated by a Supreme
Court that, as a result, left police coercion or low-level police-
violence under-regulated. 278 But suppose the driver in Knotts
272 Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
27' RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 29.1, at 639 (3d ed.
1986).
274 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
276 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 278.
27 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1023-24.
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did not know he was being followed. In that case, Stuntz would
say that no search occurred because the sense of coercion is
missing.
There is something strange about saying that spying must
be "felt" in order to be wrong. This is not to say that undetect-
ed spying is as bad as stalking; it probably is not. Stalking
describes the constant, one-sided spying that made Bentham's
Panopticon-a work camp where inmates knew a guard would
surveil them from a central tower into which the prisoners
could not see-such a brilliant method of control, without the
high costs of the dungeon's isolation.279 But as punitive as
stalking may be, it only partially captures what is wrong with
spying.
Greek myth has it that Gyges, a barbarian, succumbed to
the king of Lydia's requests that he spy on the king's own wife
and "peruse her person" while she undressed.2" Gyges knew
well the old saying "[1]et each look on his own," or, in the
queen's words, to not "behold what is not lawful for you."2"'
So when he "gazed on her [nakedness]," Gyges knew he acted
"wickedly."2 In Plato's The Republic, Glaucon told a different
version of the myth. Gyges stole a ring from a corpse he discov-
ered after an earthquake.8 3 When Gyges learned that by
turning the collet of the ring towards himself he would become
invisible, he used this power to seduce the queen and seize the
empire.2" Glaucon argues that even a just man with Gyges's
ring could not "stick by justice and bring himself to keep away
from what belongs to others and not lay hold of it, although he
had license to take what he wanted from the market without
fear."285 Socrates, however, immediately instructs Glaucon
that "the soul must do the just things, whether it has Gyges'
279 FOUCAULT, supra note 269, at 199-200.
0 See HERODOTUS, THE PERSIAN WARS ch. 8 (George Rawlinson trans., 1942).
282 Id.
2 Id. at chs. 8, 10.
283 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 359d-e, at 37 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991).
28 Id. at 360a-b, at 37-38.
'85 Id. at 360b, at 38.
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ring or not."286
Whichever version of the myth you prefer, I assume you
will concur that whatever made Gyges's actions unjust had
nothing to do with his being caught. Thus not only is Justice
Stevens correct when he says that "[a] bathtub is a less private
area when the plumber is present even if his back is
turned[,]"" ' but the reverse is true as well: the plumber's
presence ruins the privacy of even a blind or inattentive bath-
er. Spying does lose some of its aggressiveness when it is unde-
tected, though it remains aggressive to the extent that we fear
being spied on; but undetected spying never loses its privacy-
bashing essence. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much
when in Massiah v. United States25 it cited with approval a
lower-court judge who had said that surreptitious investiga-
tions conducted by undercover agents who converse with
"friends" constitute "more serious impos[itions]" than do inter-
rogations conducted by government agents known by the ac-
cused to be government agents. 89
Stuntz acknowledges the harm of undetected spying by
exempting two "paradigmatic" encounterless searches from his
thesis: house searches and wiretaps.29  But why exempt
them? Stuntz explains that the contents of houses and phone
conversations are "personal"29 ' and "plausibly distinguishable
from the kinds of information the state seeks for regulatory
purposes,"292 though elsewhere he admits that "[tihere is no
privacy-based reason for treating [regulatory] searches differ-
ently from police searches; the overbreadth phenomenon [or
what Michael Seidman calls 'collateral damage'293] is the
20 Id. at 612b, at 295.
287 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
26 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
28 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 (quoting United States v. Massiah 307 F.2d 62,
73-74 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting).
'o Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1060-62.
292 Id. at 1063.
292 Id. at 1061.
293 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1079, 1086-92 (1995).
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same in both settings."29 4 Despite this wrinkle, for Stuntz it
makes sense in privacy terms that police need a very good
reason to raid our houses or intercept our phone calls.
Stuntz's thesis thus leaves some room for the protection of
privacy without coercion, but only for "good secrets," which
concern what we do and keep in our houses and what we say
on the phone, as opposed to "bad secrets," which concern those
outside-the-house facts like the concealment of a sandwich in a
paper sack.9 ' But even the house loses some of its luster in
Stuntz's regime. For example, Stuntz says that Arizona v.
Hicks296 depicts the Court's obsession with secrecy or what I
have here been referring to as "hiddenness."297 Hicks
instantiates the "plain view" doctrine, which allows police to
seize evidence as a bonus if they discover it while lawfully
searching for or seizing something or someone else.298 In
Hicks, the Court held that a police officer who lawfully entered
Hicks's apartment soon after Hicks had shot his neighbor
through the floor could look only for Hicks, his victims, or his
weapons absent independent probable cause to look for some-
thing else.299 While there, the officer also peeked under
Hicks's turntable to get the serial numbers to find out if the
two fancy stereos in the "squalid" apartment were stolen, which
they were."' Because the officer lacked probable cause that
the stereos were stolen, moving a turntable for inspection was
an unjustified search. 01 As a result, Hicks got away with
theft, but not with the stereos.0 2
Stuntz objects to Hicks, which he reads as saying that
"each marginal search, each additional place where the officer
casts his eye, represents a separate issue and ought to be sepa-
" See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1039.
25 Id. at 1063.
116 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
27 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1022-23.
28 Id. at 1023.
2" Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325-26.
" Id. at 323.
3. Id. at 326.
-" Id. at 324.
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rately justified."3 °3 We are wrong, Stuntz insists, to perpetu-
ate a doctrine that privileges trivial dignitary interests (i.e. the
secrecy of the underside of your stereo) over non-trivial inter-
ests (i.e. the right to be free from police coercion) which, like
Hicks himself, was absent.34 Thus for Stuntz, what matters
in Hicks is not the officer's roving eye, but "the legality of the
search of the apartment in general."3 5
But searches are never general. Surely Stuntz is not saying
that the right to enter a house is the right to ransack it. Stuntz
knows that searches must be carried out, not just initiated, in a
reasonable manner. 6 Stuntz also knows that an officer can
cast his eye anywhere he wants-that's why we call it "plain
view. "3°' To be sure, police had good cause for being in Hicks's
apartment;0 8 but unless they thought Hicks, a victim, or a
gun 30 9 was hiding beneath or behind the turntable, they were
no more justified in moving the stereo than they would have
been in pumping Hicks's stomach or looking for him in a jewel-
ry box. The serial numbers were hidden, so the "view" was not
at all "plain."310 Perhaps what annoys Stuntz is that where
the police looked, like an "open field," was not "likely to contain
the sorts of things ordinary people wish to keep to them-
selves." " ' But how could police know that nothing private
would be there? A turntable can hide a love letter or an ACLU
membership card, each bespeaking "those telltales of personali-
ty" that in no sense trivialize what we mean by "private."3 2
303 Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1023.
See State v. Hicks, 707 P.2d 331, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the
apartment manager opened door for police, who "[ifn a quick search ... deter-
mined that no people were in the apartment."), affd, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
305 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1023.
31 Id. at 1066-68 (pointing out that the court in Anderson u. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987), and many commentators, failed to discuss the Fourth Amend-
ment implications of the officer's conduct during the search).
307 Id. at 1023.
311 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324.
" See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967).
310 Id. at 324-25.
311 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1030 (stating that "houses, unlike fields, do
contain things that most people want to keep to themselves").
312 See Dripps, supra note 22, at 920-21.
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Although the meaning of "private" is wider than the mean-
ing of "secret" (a crucial distinction noted in a dissent by Jus-
tice Brennan the Term before Katz was decided), 3 3 Stuntz us-
es the terms interchangably. Stanley Cavell employs a less
stingy or more ordinary definition of the private when he
writes that "[a] private conversation is one that I do not want
others to hear, not one they necessarily cannot hear. My pri-
vate entrance is one through which I can invite others; in prin-
ciple, anyone in the world can be as well acquainted with it as
I am."3"4 While Cavell's reflections are meant to capture what
he calls a "metaphysical" as opposed to "political" sense of pri-
vacy, still he reminds us that privacy largely depends on the
intentions of the interest-holder. We may safely assume that, to
paraphrase Edward Shils, those who intend to conceal mean to
control the outward flow of information about themselves, re-
gardless of whether the information is embarrassing315 and
The evil of the search lies not in the discovery of criminal evidence, but
in the concomitant exposure to the government, and thereby the world,
of all those telltales of personality revealed in any place we take for
private. To view the exclusionary rule as a personal right is to constitu-
tionally enshrine the pistol in the basement or the cocaine in the coffee
can, and to ignore as immaterial the music on the stereo, the books on
the shelf, and the fading letters in the bedroom bureau drawer.
Id.
313 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
The other half of the Government's argument is that Lopez surren-
dered his right of privacy when he communicated his "secret thoughts"
to Agent Davis. The assumption, manifestly untenable, is that the
Fourth Amendment is only designed to protect secrecy. If a person com-
mits his secret thoughts to paper, that is no license for the police to
seize the paper; if a person communicates his secret thoughts verbally to
another, that is no license for the police to record the words. On Lee
certainly rested on no such theory of waiver. The right of privacy would
mean little if it were limited to a person's solitary thoughts, and so fos-
tered secretiveness. It must embrace a concept of the liberty of one's
communications, and historically it has.
Id. (citation omitted).
314 CAVELL, supra note 13, at 330; see also SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 288 n.20 (1982) (collecting sources on
relation of secrecy to privacy).
.. See Edward Shills, Privacy: Its Constitution & Vicissitudes, 31 LAW &
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regardless of the unimagined risks that eavesdropping and
betrayal pose."' But generous conceptions of privacy like
Cavell's, Shils's and Brandeis's familiar "right to be let
alone,"" 7 or even the one I pieced together above from Florida
v. Riley,318 are too open for Stuntz, too hard to pin down.
They are, as such, too easily converted into an obsession over
what police may see and hear while disengaging us from what
really matters: physical intimidation.
At its worst, privacy is a greedy concept that promotes
hypersensitivity or an unjustified wish to manipulate and de-
fraud others. Here I borrow from Judge Posner, who, like
Stuntz, is less skeptical of seclusional claims, i.e., our right to
retire from the public to the private. For Posner, again, the
difference between police bursting into your living room on the
one hand and tapping your telephone on the other is the differ-
ence between disturbing your seclusion as opposed to (merely)
discovering your secrets.319 Posner is deeply skeptical of secre-
cy or informational claims that do nothing but enhance one's
reputation by keeping others in the dark unless the secret or
information has some innovative or entrepreneurial component
relevant to the capture of competitive market advantages.32 °
If "good" privacy claims are seclusional and "bad" privacy
claims are strictly secretive or informational and provide no
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 290 (1966).
316 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficient-
ly doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or
never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what
doubts he has, the risk is his.
Id.
317 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
318 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In Riley, Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Stevens agreed we have a right to be free from unusual modes of
surveillance. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring and Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
319 See POSNER, supra note 273.
320 See Richard S. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 403
(1978).
[Vol. 74
OVERCOMING HIDDENNESS
competitive advantage in a market, then does that mean closed
containers such as cars, pockets, paper bags or cigarette pack-
ets ordinarily are not the sources of seclusional interests? Be-
cause Stuntz thinks these places are about convenience, not
privacy, he would replace privacy protection in containers with
an emphasis on what police do to us (to our bodies) to reveal
the contents of those containers. 21
Obviously we are at an impasse: I say closed containers are
private, in part because coercion is not the Fourth
Amendment's only worry; Stuntz says they are not private
because privacy invasions tend to matter only when they are
occasioned by police coercion.322 If we treat this as an empiri-
cal problem in need of laborious questioning, Slobogin's survey
strongly implies that closed containers are private. 23 But be-
cause Stuntz's aim is to impose coherence on modern constitu-
tional law, he must foreclose on the privacy of closed contain-
ers.
324
He strongly suggests, perhaps inadvertently, that suspic-
ionless closed-container searches are okay so long as there is no
coercion involved, that is, so long as the suspect is absent when
the search takes place. But it is hard to believe that Stuntz
would go so far as to say that a police officer who, in a place he
or she has a right to be, may on a whim open Robinson's ciga-
rette package,3 25 Belton's zippered jacket pocket, 26 Lafay-
ette's shoulder bag,3 27 or Jimeno's paper sack.3 28 This, by the
32 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1065-66; William J. Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. J 393 (1995) [hereinafter Substantive
Origins].
" See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1065-66.
" Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 121, at 737-64 (confirming that while
we place the most cherished privacies of life in our phone conversations and our
houses, which contain our books and papers, searches of office doors, trunks of
cars, footlockers found in cars, and of schoolchildren's lockers were also rated as
significantly invasive).
324 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1068-78; Substantive Origins, supra note 321,
at 433-42.
325 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
121 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding that power of
arrest included power to search arrestee's jacket).
3' See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1983) (deciding search of
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way, is what Officer Biro did in United States v. Ceccolini."9
Was Biro's snooping an unjustified search because it was an
envelope in which he looked?3. So there really are private
and non-private, worthy and unworthy closed containers? That
cannot be (and in fact is not) the law." ' Please recognize that,
Stuntz is not duplicating Scalia's position in California v.
Acevedo332-that container searches should take place on
probable cause without regard to the nature of the contain-
er.33 Instead, Stuntz's coercion theory requires no antecedent
suspicion at all to authorize encounterless or
nonconfrontational invasions of closed containers.334
3. Telling a Search from a Non-search
This impasse could be resolved by upgrading the role of
intentions in assessments of when a search takes place. It
really makes little difference what privacy is used for, though
we sometimes do lose sight of that. For example, in discussing
what she calls an "innocence model" of Fourth-Amendment
privacy, Sherry Colb presupposes that privacy does not protect
criminal activity.335 In other words, only the innocent have
arrestee's bag was a valid inventory search).
328 See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
435 U.S. 268 (1978).
"' See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 270. The unlawfulness of Biro's search of
Ceccolini's envelope was uncontested. The Supreme Court ruled that a fruit of
that illegality-the discovery of a witness named Lois Hennessey-was admissible
despite that illegality. That ruling owes to what dissenting Justice Marshall criti-
cized, in obvious frustration with the majority, as a hypothetical inevitable discov-
ery rule. Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
... See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) ("[A] constitutional
distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper"); Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people and their effects, and it protects those effects whether they are
'personal' or impersonal' . . . . Once placed within such a container, a diary and
a dishpan are equally protected ... .
2 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
3 See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 584 (Scalia, J. concurring).
See generally Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1068-78 (presenting applications of
the coercion thesis to search and seizure cases).
" Sherry Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1477 (1996).
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privacy. Once we "abuse" our privacy for criminal purposes, as
she puts it, our privacy is "forfeited."3"' Thus, I take it that on
her account, if I was working preparing my federal-income
taxes in my study, the activity would be private until I decided
to fudge a deduction, at which point the activity would cease to
be private, though still occurring in my study. You can see
already what I think of this idea: indeed, privacy would do few
of us any good at all unless we were in some way embarrassed
by what we were doing. That is, abuse of seclusion is what
privacy is for. A crime committed in seclusion is done in pri-
vate; it is just that once police have knowledge of the criminal
activity, they are justified in invading the private realm for
crime-control purposes.
If our goal is to find out without first violating someone's
privacy whether we have enough suspicion about them to justi-
fy our violating their privacy, then one move we can make is to
call as much action as we plausibly can "nonsearches." This
move is expressed in the Court's cases that rule, to name just a
few, that on a whim, police can: have drug-sensitive dogs sniff
your luggage, hover over your property in airplanes or helicop-
ters, sift through your garbage, study your bank and phone
records, trespass onto your property, shine flashlights into your
car or barn, use your friends as undercover agents, and track
your movements with transmitters hidden in your effects (at
least to a point). Yet in each of these cases there is no doubt
that police intended to overcome the hiddenness of their tar-
gets, who had until then kept their activities secluded.
Two decades before Katz, bewitched by its own trespass
doctrine, the Court held in McDonald v. United States337 that
when D.C. Vice Officer Ogle (I kid you not) mounted a chair
and peeked through the transom into a leased room, he con-
ducted no search.33' As Judge Miller put it for the lower
court: "The only problem in the case is whether looking through
the transom amounted to an unlawful search. It was not gen-
' See id. at 1501.
33' 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
31 McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453-54.
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tlemanly to spy on McDonald in that manner, but his constitu-
tional rights were not thereby invaded."339 As interesting a
case as McDonald is (I recommend particularly Justice
Jackson's radical notion of standing expressed in his separate
opinion), my interest in it is in what the Court would say about
this sort of spying today. Spying is not very gentlemanly, to be
sure. But it is, one could say, very professional. Indeed, I recall
when the law school where I work amended our Student Honor
Code in response to a hate-speech incident that was not cov-
ered by our regulations, which read like a version of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, with the same sorts of defenses and termi-
nology, e.g., intoxication, specific intent, and so on. One critic of
the Committee's recommended amended Code said that it
smacked more of a Gentleman's Club Charter than a Profes-
sional Code of Conduct. As criticisms go, however, this one
struck me as flimsy: who would you rather be judged by, after
all, a gentleman or a professional? I, for one, would much rath-
er take my chances with a gentleman any day.
In other words, I am impressed by Judge Miller's choice of
words here, words which condemn Officer Ogle for his being
ungentlemanly, a standard that regrettably had no constitu-
tional force whatsoever in 1948. After Katz, however, would not
the ungentlemanly or uncivilized mode of action-here, spy-
ing-have point in constitutional law? It is an unreasonable,
even antisocial (though obviously legal) mode of action if there
ever were one. This is, I take it, precisely the upshot of Bond.
Certainly common-carrier personnel or fellow travelers could
conceivably conduct a tactile inspection of your bag stored in an
overhead rack, but what would you say to them if they did?
Again, they are not merely moving your bag or re-arranging
the other luggage to make room for their own: they are inspect-
ing your bag. And to what end, exactly? To find out what you
have hidden from them, I assume. Or, put slightly differently,
how would they feel if you saw them performing this nosy tac-
tile inspection? (In a wildly different but nonetheless apposite
.. McDonald v. United States, 166 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Ct. App. 1948), rev'd,
335 U.S. 451 (1948).
[Vol. 74
OVERCOMING HIDDENNESS
context, my civil procedure professor dubbed this the "spotlight
theory," which holds that the rightness of your positions- the
rightness of what you do-can be assessed by imagining that
they are being viewed).
I am quite sure that Officer Thielen (who peeked through
the bushes through the apartment blinds in Minnesota v. Cart-
er)340 in his role as private actor would be unlikely to stick his
nose up against a neighbor's window to see through a crack in
the blinds, nor would he, were he in his own home, likely to
write off discovering someone doing the same to him as a "risk"
of apartment life. Just as no one would describe peeking
through blinds as "seeing" or "seeing while standing in a lawful
place," no one would describe what federal agents did in Katz
as "hearing." To do so cuts off the action from its intention,
plan or operation-order. Application of Katz in "what is a
search" cases strikes me as a straightforward matter: did the
putative search victim demonstrate the intention to conceal his
activities (here, possession of an incriminating thing or fact)? If
so, then did police intend to defeat (and succeed in defeating)
that intention?
This sort of assessment of responsibility based on the in-
tentions both of victim and wrongdoer is nothing new to crimi-
nal law (to law more generally, or, for that matter, to the
world).34 Theft law turns on the intentions both of the thief
to permanently deprive the prior possessor and on whether the
prior possessor consented to the would-be thief's acquisition.
The illegality of coerced sexual exchanges also turns on inten-
tions, defined by the same relation between the intentions of
victim and wrongdoer. These are not isolated instances: the
whole idea of self-defense demands that we attend equally to
the actions of both victim and defendant.
While we can easily reach agreement that under this ap-
proach Katz manifested his intention to exclude the uninvited
o See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
"' See generally, DANIEL YEAGER, J.L. AUSTIN AND THE LAW: EXCULPATION AND
THE EXPLICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming 2005) (discussing criminal law
and its association with responsibility for human action).
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ear while federal agents simultaneously manifested their inten-
tions to overcome his privacy by electronically eavesdropping
on his conversations, his is a rather easy case under the ap-
proach that I have identified here. Perhaps a greater demand
on assessing the role of intentions in these "what is a search"
cases is provided by what I, for one, found to be a riotously
funny episode of Seinfeld, though its particular hilarity was
lost on those with whom I viewed it. In that episode, when
George learns that Jerry's new object of affection-Laura the
deaf tennis lineswoman (played by the radiant Marlee
Matlin)-reads lips, he persuades her to "read" a conversation
at an upcoming party, where George hopes to find out why a
woman there (Gwen) had broken up with him. As we know,
most problems with understanding are not acoustical, but there
are some difficulties that here quite literally are, at least if we
count them as misreadings rather than as projections. For
example, Laura reads "sex" when Jerry says "six." These snags
aside, the plan misfires and ends badly, of course, for George,
who, for anyone who takes Katz at all seriously, got what he
deserved for his skepticism, or more precisely, for his play at
penetrating the privacy of others. Ungentlemanly? Obviously.
This special skill of Laura's not only is extraordinary, but just
as importantly, is one which she knows well that others cannot
know when to be on guard against. Is lip-reading a privacy
invasion? Would it pass for argument to say that it is a risk of
living in a world where a tiny percentage of people can read
lips? But so is World War III a risk (perhaps an infelicitous
example)-but how do I guard against it? Nor is it especially
persuasive to refer to it as her mode of "hearing." That's true
enough, as far as it goes, but that is the same sort of highly
abstract or generalized description that would label Ciraolo and
Riley instances of "flying" as opposed to "spying." That may be
how she hears, but that does not mean that her powers, howev-
er necessary they may be to her flourishing, cannot be abused.
So what do we do with, say, the paper lunch sack on the
floorboard of Jimeno's car? Is it private or not? Stuntz insists
that the sandwich's presence in the sack is a matter of conve-
nience, not privacy. Not only could the same be said about
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much that is situated in our pockets, our satchels, our cars and
our homes, but worrying about whether secluding an item or
information is an assertion of privacy as opposed to a matter of
convenience will only get us into inquiries into motives: why
did you keep your drugs in the sack? Such inquiries strike me
as unlikely to bear fruit when weighed against the fact that the
drugs were, after all, in the sack. Whether concealing some-
thing may have other benefits or even purposes does not defeat
it as an act of concealment. Opening it is a penetration of the
private world. I can see no other way to see this serious matter.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court keeps enjoining litigants from
making intentions relevant to Fourth Amendment discourse, it
is difficult to abide by an injunction whose terms you do not
comprehend. The situation is far from hopeless, however. Get-
ting to the point where we can assess whether an action in
question really is constitutional requires a confrontation with
the officer's account of his intentions, a confrontation that the
Supreme Court threatens to preclude in Whren and replicated
by both majority and dissent in Bond. If Bond is an optimistic
decision from the standpoint of Katz, then its repudiation of the
function of intentions in assessing police actions is its most
obvious drawback. Intentions really do get a bad rap in the
Supreme Court.
The Justices' concerns about subjectivity would be well
founded if such inquiries really did require mind read-
ing--encounters with inner, hidden, secret selves. If that is
what confrontations with intentions entail, as so often it is
suggested they do, 2 then they should be enjoined. But con-
frontations with intentions are not attempts to penetrate pri-
342 See, e.g., Diana Roberto Donahoe, "Could Have," "Would Have:" What the
Supreme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United States, 34 AMER. CRIM.
L. REV. 1193, 1200-01 (1997) ("Although pretext, by definition, entails an assess-
ment of motive, the Supreme Court has clearly held that an inquiry into the
officer's subjective state of mind is inappropriate. This rule makes sense when
one considers the difficulty of reading the officer's mind as he makes quick deci-
sions on the street.") (footnotes omitted).
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vacy; they are attempts to evoke responses about how things
were with the person whose intentions we question. And by
asking that they explain how things were with them-what
they were doing, what the plan was, what remained incidental,
what went wrong-we are asking them to elaborate the public,
observable world when we feel the need to make sense of an
action that strikes us as unusual or untoward. Without leaving
room in constitutional criminal procedure for so central, so
homely an activity as the proffering of an excuse, we impede
the entire project of regulating police, whose actions can be
neither meaningfully praised nor meaningfully blamed if they
cannot be understood.
By arguing here for the relevance, even centrality, of inten-
tions in any regime directed at regulating the police, I am not
suggesting that motives themselves are hidden or inner and
should, for that reason, be banished from criminal-procedure
discourse. They are not. Motives themselves are directed in a
way that they can be assessed, given that they tend to culmi-
nate in the realization or setting up of a plan. It is not, there-
fore, that motives are interior any more than intentions are.
The problem with motives, that is, what accounts for their
limited relevancy to evaluations of human action, is that mo-
tives are by definition external to the action: their
"directedness" points the actor at other actions, other plans,
other upshots. And given that in moral discourse, be it in the
context of law or in garden-variety settings, we are generally
more concerned with what people are doing than why they are
doing it (what they hope to get out of it), the Supreme Court is
correct to deeply discount the importance of motives in evalua-
tions of police practices. What is left now is only to see the
extent to which the criteria of motives diverge from those of
intentions; to acknowledge as much is essential in assessing
whether a search or seizure is pretextual as opposed to uncon-
stitutional, or here, whether a search takes place at all, a seri-
ous matter for the Fourth Amendment.
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